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This dissertation develops a model to understand the joint role of social capital and 
nonviolent resistance campaigns to obtain concessions and changes in public goods 
provision in new democracies and in democracies with weak party systems. The factors 
that explain variation in effectiveness among nonviolent campaigns have been 
understudied. By adding social capital to the analysis, this dissertation contributes to 
filling this theoretical and empirical void. I use data from Perú to provide empirical 
support to my theory.  
 In Chapter 2, a micro-level theory of nonviolent campaigns is developed. This 
theory argues that by making cooperation easier, social capital increases the levels of 
participation in nonviolent campaigns, thereby making concessions more likely. A 
novel result of this theory is that it shows that social capital is a key feature of social 
life that can help to generate disruptive collective actions but also to prevent the use of 
such disruptive means. Thus, under some circumstances, social capital can help to 
reduce the observed disruptive actions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 test the theoretical propositions derived in Chapter 2 using 
Peruvian data. Chapter 3 finds that social capital has a negative statistically significant 
  
effect on some types of nonviolent campaigns but positive effects on other types of 
nonviolent campaigns. Chapter 3 also provides evidence that peasant communities’ 
organizations in the first half of the 20th century were product of persistence effects of 
early colonial extractive institutions (i.e. the mining mita) with colonial revolts as 
important channels of persistence. 
Chapter 4 shows that nonviolent campaigns and social capital form a positive 
interactive relationship to affect the provision of public goods at the local level. Social 
capital makes more likely nonviolent campaign’s success. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
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Robert Solow asserted that once capital and labor have jointly produced a commodity, 
there is no technical and impartial way to distribute its value among the owners of the 
inputs. As long as capital needs labor, the actual distribution of what they jointly 
produce will depend on the amount of political power that each factor has. Realizing 
this fact in my undergrad years kindled my interest in politics and in political economy.  
This interest led me to pursue graduate studies in economics and politics. During my 
graduate studies, I learned that economic and political institutions matter for economic 
development. However, not all countries chose to establish institutions that are most 
favorable for economic development. According to a recent literature, this occurs 
because the institutions that prevail in a given country are determined by societal 
groups that have the political power to establish the institutions that preferentially 
benefit them. Thus, political power is of paramount importance to understand actual 
institutional settings. The de jure political power is determined by political institutions, 
but the de facto political power comes from the distribution of resources in a country. 
In other words, those that have significant wealth will likely be able to exert power to 
shape outcomes in a society. This conclusion seems to be challenged by observation of 
nonviolent campaigns against mining firms at the local level.  In these conflicts, groups 
of citizens without much economic power were able to stop multinational mining firms’ 
projects. These groups of citizens were normally labeled by the national media as prone 
to violence, irrational groups that are simply against development. Are these groups 





questions made me focus on the study of conflicts at the local level, which are the core 
of this dissertation. From studying nonviolent campaigns in Perú, I conclude that 
peasant communities matter for shaping conflicts at the local level, moreover I also 
conclude that citizens’ decisions to engage in nonviolent campaigns are perfectly 
rational considering that at the local level there exist a set of historical determined 
informal institutions. Finally, the theory and the empirical results of this study led me 
to conclude that among the groups that engage in local conflicts, peasant communities 
can help to generate disruptive collective actions but also to prevent the use of such 
disruptive means: peasant communities can also help to reduce conflicts. 
The development of the theoretical framework of this dissertation would not have been 
possible without professor Johanna Birnir.  Johanna Birnir’s keen understanding of 
contentious politics have helped me in several ways, from helping me to notice patterns 
in my data which I otherwise would not have perceived easily, to pointing me in the 
direction of relevant literature. Professor Birnir was always supportive and 
understanding, for all that, I will be eternally grateful.  I want to extend also my 
gratitude to Ernesto Calvo, for always having a key suggestion to improve the quality 
of my work, time to read my manuscripts, and responding to my emails. I want to also 
extend my gratitude to professors William Reed, Margaret Pearson, and Sebastian 
Galiani. Their comments on my manuscript have certainly improved its quality.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Can social capital1 make nonviolent resistance2 (henceforth NVR) campaigns more 
effective in obtaining concessions? Does social capital only help to coordinate and execute 
disruptive collective actions within NVR campaigns, or can it also reduce the need for 
disruptive collective actions to obtain concessions? These are unanswered questions in the 
NVR literature because the focus of this literature so far has been on comparing the 
effectiveness of NVR campaigns with violent means to obtain regime changes or other 
political concessions (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011)  
According to the NVR literature, NVR campaigns are more likely to succeed than 
violent campaigns because more people participates in NVR campaigns.  High levels of 
participation occur because the moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to 
participation are much lower in NVR campaigns than in violent insurgencies (Chenoweth 
and Stephan, 2011:24). But, within NVR campaigns, how can we explain differences in 
participation and effectiveness if all these campaigns are using the same nonviolent low-
cost means? This dissertation argues that social capital can explain these differences among 
NVR campaigns. By making cooperation easier, social capital helps to increase the levels 
 
1 Social capital refers to features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve 
the efficiency of the society by facilitating coordinated actions. Communities that have inherited a substantial 
stock of social capital find voluntary cooperation easier often due to shared norms of reciprocity and networks 
of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993:167). 
		2	Nonviolent resistance is defined as nonstate unarmed opposition campaigns, including boycotts, strikes, 




of participation, thereby making concessions more likely. Furthermore, this dissertation 
also shows that depending on whether the receiver of claims (henceforth RC) is external3 
or internal, social capital can have opposite effects in the number of disruptive events (e.g. 
boycotts, strikes, protest, and organized noncooperation) necessary to obtain concessions.  
The mechanism underlying these contrasting effects is explained in detail in Chapter 2. 
However, below I explain these mechanisms briefly. I start by explaining how the 
contrasting effects work with high levels of social capital for both the external and internal 
actors respectively, then I explain the contrasting effects with low levels of social capital. 
In the context of high levels of social capital, if the RC is an external actor, then the 
number of disruptive events that the claimants must execute to obtain concessions will be 
large. This will occur for two reasons. First, the receiver of the claims will only concede if 
it is in his best interest, which will happen if the cost of conceding is less than the costs4 
generated by the disruptive actions. In turn, disruptive actions will be more costly if they 
are sustained for a longer time. Second, the only way claimants can inform the RC of their 
high capacity to engage in sustained disruptive collective actions (that comes from high 
levels of social capital) is by actually engaging in sustained disruptive actions. This claim 
is in line with Chenoweth and Olsen (2016) who show that multiple coordinated events are 
crucial to obtain concessions. They found that multiple coordinated events over time are 
more effective than a single, one-off event: 21% of civil resistance efforts that included 
 
3 An external RC is defined as an actor that does not know or does not attribute legitimacy to the levels of 
social capital shared among the claimants and does not have access to the networks included in the social 
capital. The internal RC does know the levels of social capital shared among the claimants and has access to 
the networks included in the social capital. 
4 In the case of the corporate mining firms, in addition to stopping their normal functioning for some days, 
protests might have a negative effect on corporate share value (King and Soule 2007). Boycotts can also 
have undesirable effects on corporate finances (Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; Pruitt and Friedman 
1986) or negative effects on corporate reputation (McDonnell and King 2013). 
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only one event were successful in achieving partial or full accommodation of their requests, 
but 49% of efforts that included at least two events were successful. The greater the number 
of events, the more likely it was that the corporation made concessions.  
An example where a local population has claims over an external RC is when a 
multinational mineral extraction firm operates in a small district with high levels of social 
capital. Due to grievances, the local population will have claims over the resources 
available to the mining firm, but the firm’s focus is on obtaining all legal permits and 
abiding by all central government regulations. Initially, the firm does not know or does not 
attribute legitimacy to local organizations nor to their rules of civic engagement and 
networks of reciprocity. Furthermore, the mining firm ignores the local organizations’ 
capacity to engage in boycotts, strikes, and protests that could increase its costs. For this 
reason, the firm will not concede to the local organizations’ claims immediately. Thus, in 
order to obtain concessions, the local claimants will have to engage in boycotts, strikes, 
protests, and other disruptive actions to demonstrate their high capacity to organize 
collective actions not once but on many occasions. In turn, executing multiple events 
demonstrates that they can impose sustained costs to the RC.  By doing this, the claimants 
are showing their high capacity to fight and resist. Given the lack of other communication 
channels, disruptive actions are the only way to transfer information to the firm about the 
costs of not conceding. Only after internalizing the information of claimants’ high capacity 
for resistance will the firm concede to the claims. 
On the other hand, if the RC is an internal actor that understands the high levels of 
social capital among the claimants and has access to the networks included in the social 
capital, the number of disruptive events that the claimants have to execute to obtain 
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concessions will be low. This will occur because the RC knows beforehand that the 
claimants have the capacity to make him comply (because of their high social capital), and 
for this reason he decides to concede and avoid the cost of many disruptive events. 
Networks that are included in social capital can also transfer information to the RC of 
claims about their demands and the disruptive actions to be taken if he decides not to 
concede; this information will make him concede faster. An example of this type of 
situation occurs when a local population has claims over a local political authority (e.g., 
the local mayor) in a district with high social capital. The local mayor is clearly an internal 
RC since he is most likely informed about the organization and networks that constitute 
the high levels of social capital at the local level (he most likely belongs to one of the 
organizations or he has seen them executing collective actions before). Through the 
existent networks, these organizations will easily transfer information to the local mayor 
about both their demands and the actions to be taken if the mayor does not concede. The 
mayor knows that the organizations can make him comply and decides to concede without 
much need for disruptive collective actions. 
Finally, if there are low levels of social capital among the claimants with an internal 
RC, the claimants might still engage in uncoordinated weak disruptive actions for some 
periods due to the existent grievances. The RC will not concede because he knows that 
these disruptive events will not have significant levels of participation (the internal RC 
knows the meager levels of social capital at the local level). Similarly, if there are low levels 
of social capital among the claimants with an external RC, the initial decision of the RC 
will be not to concede because he ignores the levels of social capital. He will not concede 
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later as well, because he will realize that there is no strength among the claimants to engage 
in sustained strong disruptive actions.  
 The contrasting effects of social capital explained so far are summarized in Table 1 
below. By making cooperation easier, social capital helps to solve the collective action 
problem which, in turn, increases the levels of participation, thereby making concessions 
more likely regardless of the type of RC. 
 




High conflict.  
Low concessions. 
Low conflict,  
High Concessions. 





 Low concessions. 
High conflict.  
High Concessions. 
 
Table 1. Summarizing the Contrasting Coordination Effects of Social Capital 
 
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I develop a theoretical framework that explains in detail 
the contrasting effects of social capital. I refer to this theory as the Contrasting 
Coordination Effects of Social Capital Model (henceforth CCESC Model). The CCESC 
model mainly analyzes the strategic interactions between claimants and the RC; the model 
is not suitable for analyzing contention with additional actors (such as political parties, 
central states, etc.) having relevant strategic roles. Thus, the CCESC model represents 
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strategic interactions at the subnational level in which: i) political parties do not have strong 
presence at the local level, and ii) the central state and judiciary power have aligned their 
interest with the extraction firms’ interest but are unable to use lethal force against the 
claimants. These two situations are likely to be observed in countries with weak party 
systems and weak states, as occurs in some Latin American countries, or in new 
democracies, as occurs in some countries in Africa. 
To evaluate the CCESC model empirical predictions, I use data from the Peruvian 
ombudsman agency about NVR campaigns. In this country, there is a weak party system 
and the central government’s role in nonviolent campaigns at the subnational level is either 
nonexistent or biased towards the interests of one type of RC. I analyze the two main types 
of conflicts that have occurred in the Peruvian context: local and mining conflicts5. In a 
local conflict, citizens or organizations of citizens have claims over the resources available 
to the local government. In a mining conflict, citizens or organizations of citizens have 
claims over the resources available to a mining firm. These two types of conflict account 
for approximately 53% of the total number of conflicts reported in Peru.   
The Peruvian mining conflicts fit the definition of NVR campaigns against a corporate 
firm as provided in Chenoweth and Olsen (2016), but most importantly, they are NVR 
campaigns with an external RC. The local conflicts instead fit the definition of NVR 
campaigns with an internal RC. These two types of conflicts are NVR campaigns because 
the means used by the claimants to obtain concessions are nonviolent such as blockades, 
boycotts, strikes, and protests.  The variables that represent social capital in this dissertation 
are indicators of the quantity and geographical spread of communal organizations with 
 
5 I use the “monthly conflict reports” elaborated by the Peruvian Ombudsman Agency (Defensoría del 
Pueblo), in which the NVR campaigns are called conflicts.   
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historical roots that can be traced as far back as the 18th century. These communal 
organizations are known in Peru as peasant communities and are the main form of 
organizations in the rural space (Diez, 2010). Peasant communities have three main 
characteristics: i) they hold communal property rights and shared use of land, ii) there are 
bonds of reciprocity and kinship among the members, and iii) they have an internal 
organization to choose their leadership (Diez, 1999).	
In Chapter 3, I exploit the variation produced by a natural experiment that generated 
revenue windfalls for both mining firms and local governments in Perú6 to empirically 
evaluate the opposite effects suggested by the CCESC model. The results show that after a 
revenue windfall, communities with higher social capital increased the number of months 
with active nonviolent campaigns against mining companies but reduced the number of 
months with active nonviolent campaigns against local governments. Overall, these results 
highlight that social capital serves not only to organize disruptive collective actions but 
also to reduce the use of such disruptive means.  
 In Chapter 4, I turn to the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of both local and 
mining conflicts in obtaining concessions. The concessions are measured as changes in the 
local government budget assigned to discretionary investments. Budget assigned to 
investments are resources destined to build some type of infrastructure at the local level. 
Thus, this type of expenditure provides public goods at the local level. The results support 
the predictions of the CCESC model for each of the two types of conflicts analyzed in 
Chapter 3. 
 




First, I found that local NVR campaigns led to substitution effects in local government’s 
budgets from regular expenditures (e.g. expenditures assigned to salaries, goods, etc.) to 
public goods expenditures. The decision to make this type of reallocation can only be made 
by the local authorities (the local mayor). In other words, local conflicts caused the local 
political authorities to reallocate budget towards the provision of public goods. The higher 
the levels of social capital, the higher the levels of reallocation of the budget towards public 
goods provision. 
Second, according to the CCESC model, successful mining NVR campaigns should 
generate transfers from the mining firm to the local population for the provision of public 
goods. Unfortunately, detailed data about transfers from mining firms to local populations 
is not available. Instead, I have analyzed the impact of mining NVR campaigns on 
discretionary transfers for public goods provision coming from the central government. 
This is a valid proxy measure because the central government normally promotes 
investments in the mining sector, meaning it will act mostly in favor of the mining firm 
(Revesz and Diez, 2006). Based on this assumption, I argue that mining NVR campaigns 
will generate more discretionary transfers for public goods provision from the central to 
the local government aiming to persuade local populations to allow the mining activities 
without disruptions. This is precisely the effect found in Chapter 4; the mining NVR 
campaigns generated more discretionary transfers for public goods provision from the 
central government. Furthermore, the higher the levels of social capital, the greater the 




The four chapters of this dissertation provide both theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the study of NVR campaigns. The theoretical contribution is to add social 
capital as a crucial element to obtain concessions and as a key feature of social life that can 
help to generate disruptive collective actions but also to prevent the use of such disruptive 
actions.  
The empirical contribution is to provide large sample evidence of the contrasting effects of 
social capital on NVR campaigns at the subnational level, previous studies relied mostly 










Chapter 2: The Contrasting Coordination Effects of Social Capital 
Model 
 
This chapter develops a theory of NVR campaigns in which social capital explains 
differences in effectiveness to obtain concessions. Furthermore, this theory focuses on the 
differences that arise from having two types of receiver of claims (henceforth RC): external 
and internal. An external RC does not know or does not attribute legitimacy to the levels 
of social capital shared among the claimants and does not have access to the networks 
included in social capital.7 An internal RC does know and does give legitimacy to the social 
capital existent among the claimants.  
A central claim of the theory developed in this chapter is that depending on whether 
the receiver of claims is external or internal, social capital can have opposite effects on the 
number of disruptive events (e.g. boycotts, strikes, protest, and organized noncooperation) 
necessary to obtain concessions.  I call this model The Contrasting Coordination Effects of 
Social Capital model (CCESC). 
Moving the analysis to the strategic interactions at a micro level, the CCESC model 
argues that informal institutions that imply agreements containing punishments in case of 
defection can be represented by temporal punishments equilibria (trigger strategies) in 
infinitely repeated games. Thus, the CCESC model use as baseline the equilibria of an 
infinitively repeated game which I have labeled as the infinitely repeated protester dilemma 
(presented in section 2.2).  In section 2.3, the CCESC model develops a theory to explain 
the process of moving from one equilibrium to another after an exogenous shock (e.g. a 
revenue windfall) create grievances within the original equilibrium. The CCESC model 
 




argues that NVR disruptive actions are necessary to move to the new equilibrium. Roughly 
described, the process begins with the exogenous shock, then generates NVR campaigns 
that include disruptive events and finishes with changes in transfers and public policies at 
the local level.  
The rest of chapter 2 proceeds as follows: In section 2.1., I present a literature review that 
summarizes four bodies of theory relevant to the CCESC model and describe how the 
CCESC model develops from them.  In section 2.2, I describe a generic infinitely repeated 
protester dilemma: the stage game and its equilibria, the infinitely repeated game and all 
the relevant SPNE. In section 2.3, I discuss the dynamics that occurs when moving from 
one equilibrium to another after an exogenous wealth-increasing change in the infinitely 
repeated game. Most importantly, I analyze the differentiated role of social capital on each 
of the two types of conflicts studied in this dissertation. Finally, I present a set of testable 
propositions for each type of conflict. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
The CCESC model borrows many components from important approaches in political 
science and economic theory. I summarize four bodies of theory relevant to the CCESC 
model and describe how the CCESC model develops from them.  These approaches are the 
social movements literature, the non-violent resistance literature, the social capital 
literature, and the collective action approach to social dilemmas. 
 
Social Movements Literature 
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The social movements literature aims to explain why social actors use disruptive 
means such as protest and rebellion to achieve their political goals. Early approaches 
focused on the underlying psychological conditions that motivate individuals to participate 
in collective actions. Important among these conditions were social alienation, and relative 
deprivation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). According to this literature, protest and rebellion 
are triggered when certain grievances reach a threshold or boiling point. This approach is 
known as the grievance-based conception of social movements. 
In contrast, the resource mobilization approach focuses on the amount of resources 
available to the aggrieved sector and on mobilization structures such as social groups, 
organizations and networks as the main determinant factors explaining social movements 
(Ganson, 1975; McCarty and Zald, 1977).  
A third approach argued that movements will succeed or fail based on the political 
opportunity structures, which are consistent dimensions of political environment that either 
encourage or discourage people from using collective action. This approach is known as 
the political opportunity approach (Tarrow, 1998:18).  
Among the three approaches to social movements summarized above, relative 
deprivation is particularly relevant to the CCESC model since it explains that individuals 
can feel aggrieved even if they are not worse off. This occurs because relative deprivation 
is defined as the discrepancy between an individual’s expectations of rightful entitlements 
and her capacity to attain them. For instance, if a wealth increasing social change occurs at 
the local level, individuals will feel aggrieved if they do not obtain their fair share even 
though they are not worse off. The CCESC model argues that this kind of grievance 




The Non-violent Resistance Literature (NVR) 
Non-violent resistance campaigns are defined as nonstate unarmed opposition 
campaigns, including boycotts, strikes, protest, and organized noncooperation to exact 
political concessions and challenge entrenched power. Thus, civil resistance is a technique 
of conflict in which unarmed civilians confront an opponent using a variety of tactics that 
do not physically harm or threaten to physically harm the opponent. Among the first studies 
within the NVR literature is the study by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). The main 
objective of this study was to compare the effectiveness of NVR campaigns with the 
effectiveness of violent campaigns to obtain regime change. The authors documented a 
higher rate of success of NVR campaigns in a set of regime change campaigns. This pattern 
is explained by the fact that nonviolent campaigns facilitate the active participation of more 
people than violent campaigns, thereby broadening the base of resistance and raising the 
opponent’s costs to maintain the status quo. The mass civilian participation in a nonviolent 
campaign is more likely to backfire in the face of repression, encourage loyalty shifts 
among regime supporters, and provide resistance leaders with a more diverse menu of 
tactical and strategic choices (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011:25).  
Although, the concept of non-violent resistance was originally used to describe 
resistance against a political authority, Chenoweth and Olsen (2016) have studied non-
violent resistance against corporate firms. In this study they also highlight that a high 
degree of participation is fundamental to obtain concessions.  They found that multiple 
coordinated events over time are more effective than a single, one-off event. 21% of civil 
resistance efforts that included only one event were successful in achieving partial or full 
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accommodation of their requests, but 49% of efforts that included at least two events were 
successful. The greater the number of events, the more likely it was that the corporation 
made concessions.  
 The NVR approach is of particular relevance to the CCESC model for two reasons. 
First, the types of conflicts that my theoretical framework aims to explain are also low 
intensity conflicts “in which unarmed civilians confront an opponent using a variety of 
tactics that do not physically harm or threaten to physically harm the opponent” Chenoweth 
and Stephan (2011). Additionally, in the conflicts that the CCESC model explains, the RC 
also bears more disproportionally resource or political power compared to the claimants. 
Second, NVR requires broad participation and persistence to succeed. Persistence in NVR 
campaigns against corporate power implies that multiple disruptive events were necessary 
to obtain concessions. This highlights the multistage or dynamic nature of NVR episodes. 
The CCESC model also focuses on these crucial characteristics (broad participation and 
persistence) but from a different perspective. The CCESC model approaches conflict as 
repeated games in which high level of participation is explained not because the absence 
of violent means reduces the cost of participation but by the existence of social capital that 
helps to coordinate actions and beliefs. 
 
Social Capital Literature 
Social capital has been given several definitions. Bourdieu (1986) defined it “as the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to a possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
 
 15 
recognition.” Two important elements of this definition are network of social relations, and 
the resources provided by this network.  
Elinor Ostrom defines social capital as “The shared knowledge, understandings, norms, 
rules, and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a 
recurrent activity.” (Ostrom, 2000:176).  Ostrom’s definition focuses on shared knowledge, 
but most importantly, this knowledge is used for a certain activity. Robert Putnam adds a 
crucial element to this definition by highlighting that social capital is particularly relevant 
for activities that require cooperation. Social capital refers to features of social 
organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society 
by facilitating coordinated actions. Communities that inherited a substantial stock of social 
capital find voluntary cooperation easier often due to shared norms of reciprocity and 
networks of civic engagement (Putnam, 1993:167). Thus, although social capital is a set of 
shared knowledge in the minds of the individuals that possess it, it also brings resources 
to these individuals. The most important of these resources is the coordination capacity 
which allows to solve the collective action problem. This characteristic is the most relevant 
for my theoretical framework. 
The CCESC model explains the whole contentious process that begins with the exogenous 
wealth increasing shock, then generates conflicts that include disruptive events and finishes 
with changes in transfers and public policies at the local level. At early stages of this 
process, social capital has a key role in determining the intensity of the conflict. Hence, in 
these early stages, social capital is an independent variable and conflict is the main 
dependent variable. Recent scholarship has focused on the opposite effect: the effect of 
conflict on social capital. By focusing on the effect that conflict has over social capital 
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(mostly the effect of civil wars on social capital), the recent literature has treated social 
capital as the main dependent variable to be explained. From these studies, the main 
conclusion is that conflict has a robust positive and persistent effect over social capital, 
Bauer et al. (2016).     
Since social capital makes cooperation and collective action easier, it might be logical to 
conclude that social capital will have a positive effect on NVR campaigns. However, the 
CCESC model argues that social capital can have opposite effects on conflict depending 
on the type of  RC (external or internal to a set of citizens and communities that share 
networks of social engagement and reciprocity). The theoretical and empirical evidence 
provided in this dissertation is that social capital has contrasting effects on conflict is novel 
in the social capital literature.   
In a recent study, Alcorta et al. (2020) found contrasting effects of social capital on self-
reported support and participation in political violence. The effects depended on the type 
of social capital measured. The authors measured two types of social capital: cognitive and 
structural. Cognitive social capital refers to “shared norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs” 
(Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000) and structural social capital consists of a variety of forms 
of social organization, including networks, roles, rules, and procedures (Uphoff, 2000). 
Accordingly, the study found that higher levels of cognitive social capital were associated 
with less support for and participation in political violence whereas higher levels of 
structural social capital were associated with more support for and participation in political 
violence. Alcorta et al. (2020), nevertheless, does not study actual contention but self-
reported support and participation in political violence. This dissertation does analyze the 
contrasting effects of social capital in actual conflictive episodes keeping constant the type 
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of social capital. Furthermore, the measurements of social capital used in this dissertation 
are objective measures that, I argue, measure the quantity and geographical spread of 
communal organizations with historical roots that can be traced as far as the 18th century. 
These communal organizations are known in Peru as peasant communities which are the 
main form of organizations in the rural space (Diez, 2010). These organizations have three 
main characteristics: i) they hold communal property rights and shared use over land, ii) 
there are bonds of reciprocity and kinship among the members, and iii) they have an 
internal organization to choose their leadership (Diez, 1999). 
 
Social Dilemmas and Collective Action 
One of the fundamental problems in political science and economics is the problem of 
social dilemmas. Social dilemmas occur whenever individuals in interdependent situations 
face choices in which the maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving 
all participants worse off than feasible alternatives. The tragedy of the commons and the 
provision of public goods are two known examples of social dilemmas. In all models of 
social dilemma, a group of players are involved in a game in which the strategy profile 
leading to a Nash equilibrium for a single iteration of the game yields a less than optimal 
outcome for all involved. Hence, the equilibrium is Pareto inferior. The optimal outcome 
could be achieved if those involved cooperated by selecting strategies different from those 
prescribed by the equilibrium solution and their dominant strategies (Ostrom, 1998:4). As 
I will argue in the next section of this chapter, the decision to engage in protest or use 
disruptive means to obtain concessions is also a social dilemma.   
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The prediction of a suboptimal outcome for the single Iteration of the game Is not supported 
by many observed situations in which people actually cooperate (Lichbach, 1995). One 
way in which this puzzle was solved theoretically was by moving from analyzing a single 
iteration of the social dilemma to analyzing repeated iterations in which the dilemma is 
played repeatedly. In the context of multiple iterations of a social dilemma, two types of 
uncertainties were introduced to explain why people cooperate instead of following the 
actions prescribed by the Nash equilibrium. The first is the uncertainty about the types of 
players participating in a social dilemma. Uncertainty about the presence of an irrational 
player that reciprocates with cooperation explains that a rational player will chose to 
cooperate at early stages and switch to no cooperation at the end of a finitely repeated game 
Kreps et al. (1982).  The second uncertainty is about the number of repetitions that the 
game will have. If players have a sufficient degree of uncertainty about when the repetition 
will cease, then the interaction can be treated as an infinitely repeated game (Fudemberg 
and Maskin, 1986). Furthermore, in a finitely repeated game any feasible outcome of the 
stage game with higher payoffs than the Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by 
the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long 
horizon. This result and similar are known as the Folk Theorem (Benoit and Krishna, 1985; 
Fudemberg and Maskin, 1986). This means that the Folk Theorem asserts than an infinite 
number of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) exist. This assertion solves the social 
dilemma in the sense that it shows how cooperation can be achieved in a fully rational way, 




My theoretical framework builds upon this result. First, in the Folk Theorem at least two 
types of strategies can be part of a cooperation SPNE: a grim trigger strategy and a trigger 
strategy. A grim trigger strategy is a strategy that implies a continuous and permanent 
punishment if the cooperation path is not followed. A trigger strategy implies only a 
temporary punishment. My theory argues that, regarding conflict, the type of informal 
institutional arrangements that can exist at the local level have a form that resembles a 
trigger strategy.8  Second, my theory argues that social capital is of utter importance in 
determining the specific SPNE that will be chosen among the infinite equilibria available.   
To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has used the equilibrium concept that 
contains trigger strategies (temporary punishments) to model low intensity NVR conflicts. 
Also, no previous study has used social capital as the main coordination device in an 
infinitely repeated game. For instance, Weingast (1995) used an infinitively repeated game 
to model the incentives that make governments abide to the rule of law under a 
constitutional system. However, for Weingast the main coordination device is the 
constitution. According to Weingast, a constitutional government won’t expropriate 
against any group of citizens because if it does it, all members of the society will rebel and 
will take that ruler out of power. This is equivalent to a punishment forever or a grim trigger 
strategy. According to Weingast, a constitution is the main coordination device to select an 
equilibrium among the many possible equilibria since it establishes the type of 
transgressions (actions) that are “tolerable” or legitimate. 
 
8 A temporary punishment equilibrium can be understood as an agreement to which agents will abide and 




Temporary punishment strategies as parts of an equilibrium make much more sense since 
it is hard to observe actual situations in which groups of citizens engage in disruptive 
actions forever (as would be with a grim trigger strategy). What we do observe are groups 
of citizens engaging in disruptive collective actions temporarily. 
As will be developed in detail later in this chapter, my theoretical framework consists in 
an infinitely repeated game9 in which the stage game10 is a social dilemma for the decision 
to engage in protest or not. Furthermore, I argue that in this infinitely repeated game the 
type of equilibria that is relevant to CCESC model are the temporary punishment equilibria.  
I argue that these types of equilibria resemble better what is actually observed. 
The CCESC explains how the movement from one equilibrium to another occurs after an 
exogenous wealth increasing shock.  Furthermore, my theory argues that disruptive or 
transgressive events are necessary to move from one equilibrium to another.  
 
2.2 The Infinitely Repeated Protester’s Dilemma 
2.2.1 Stage Game  
Players, actions and Payoffs 
The stage game has a unique receiver of claims (which would be either the mining firm or 
the local government) and potentially many groups of citizens which are the claimants11. 
The Receiver of claims is denoted by RC, and the two groups of citizens are denoted by A 
 
9 When the game advances from one period to the next, all previous actions are known publicly, thus the 
game is a dynamic game with complete information.  
 
10 The static game that will be played repeatedly is also called the “stage game”. 
 
11 I do not include the national government because the central government always aligns its preferences 
with either the resource extraction firm or with the local government. 
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and B. In this game, the RC decides between two types of actions: one that is generous in 
the provision of transfers, and/or public goods, that directly benefit the population (G) and 
another type of actions that is meager in transfers, public good and services (~G). The two 
citizen groups can observe the decision made by the  RC and they decide 
simultaneously whether or not to engage in some sort of disruptive or transgressive action 
intended to block or limit the functioning of the RC government (F or ~F). This sequence 
of actions is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
When the RC chooses to implement generous policies (G), the citizens receive a benefit 
𝑃(𝜏), which represents the transfers or public goods provided by the RC, where 𝜏 represent 
the amount of money that the RC spends in the transfers or public goods.  
If the RC choses ~G, then the citizens do not receive benefits from the public good 𝑃(𝜏)  
unless both groups choose to protest. In this case, they have enough power to force the RC 
to provide the transfers and/or public goods anyway. If no group or only one group protests, 
then public goods are not provided, 𝑃(𝜏) = 0. 
Avoiding these disruptive events is valuable for the RC.12  In a given period, if both groups 
of citizens engage in protests, then the level of disturbance is too high such that the payoff 
for the RC in that period is 0 and the RC will have to provide the transfers (𝜏) anyway. If 
 
12 As mentioned before, mining corporate firms, additionally to stop their normal functioning for some days, 
protest might have a negative effect on corporate share value (King and Soule 2007), also boycotts can have 
undesirable effects on corporate finances (Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer 1997; Pruitt and Friedman 1986), or 
a negative effect on corporate reputation (McDonnell and King 2013). In the case of the local government, 




only one group of citizens engage in protests, then the payoff for the RC is 𝑀(. If neither 
of the groups engage in collective action, then the payoffs of this outcome for the RC is 
denoted by 𝑅(. Thus, 𝑅( > 𝑀(>0. The transfers (𝜏) are discounted from the RC’s payoff.  
Engaging in collective action is costly for the citizens. In order to engage in protests and 
collective actions they have to halt their regular activities to participate in road blockades, 
demonstrations, boycotts, etc. This cost, 𝐶,, is the same for both groups and we assume 
that 𝑃(𝜏) ≥ 𝐶,. 
Two characteristics of the static model are worth to be explained. First, when all the groups 
of citizens engage in protest (F), they obtain their objective (𝑃(𝜏)); regardless of the 
willingness of the RC to provide these benefits. This feature of the game is similar to 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s main claim that NVR episodes are effective because they obtain 
higher levels of participation and mobilization. Thus, this feature of my static game 
resembles Chenoweth and Stephan’s claim about the effectiveness of greater levels of 
participation on NVR success. 
Second, the static game assumes that when the groups of citizens chose to participate in a 
disruptive action (they chose F) they generate a reduction in O.C’s payoff from 𝑅( (when 
the RC choses ~G and both citizens chose ~F ) to levels as low as 0 − 𝜏 (when the RC 
chose either  ~G or G,  and both citizens chose F ). This feature of the game resembles 
Chenoweth and Stpehan’s claim that NVR campaigns indeed impose costly sanctions on 




Figure 1. The Protesters’ Dilemma. Stage Game 
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Stage Game Nash Equilibria 
Table 1 above shows the payoff matrix of the stage game. There are two Nash Equilibria 
in this game (~𝐺,~𝐹, ~𝐹) and (~𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐹).  The first NE occurs when the RC chooses not 
to be generous in the provision of transfers, and/or public goods, ~𝐺, and neither of the 
citizen groups engage in protests since it is costly.  The second NE implies that the RC will 
try to be meager in the provision of transfers, and/or public goods, but both players decide 
jointly to engage in protests obtaining transfers anyway. The payoffs of this equilibrium 
are (0 − 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,) where the first element of the triple corresponds to the 
payoff of the RC., and the second and third elements correspond to the payoffs of group A 
and B respectively. 
There is another profile of strategies that generates payoffs that are pareto superior to the 
payoffs of the second Nash Equilibrium. This profile is (𝐺, ~𝐹, ~𝐹) with payoffs 
4𝑅( − 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏), 𝑃(𝜏)5.  This profile is what would be normally regarded as a “socially 
desirable” outcome, since this is the outcome in which the RC implements policies 
generous in the provision of transfers, and/or public goods, and there is no social cost due 
to social unrest (𝐺, ~𝐹, ~𝐹). Nevertheless, this socially desirable and pareto superior 
outcome is not a Nash Equilibrium. In the next section, based on the folk theorem, I argue 
that in the infinitely repeated version of this static game, there exists a Sub Game Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) such that the Pareto Superior payoffs of the static game can be 





2.2.2 The Infinitely Repeated Protesters’ Dilemma 
In general, an infinitely repeated game is useful to model strategic interactions whenever 
it is reasonable to assume that the players have a ‘sufficient’ degree of uncertainty about 
when the repetition (or the interactions) will cease. I argue that this is the case in the 
Peruvian context for the two types of conflicts studied.  First, in the case of local conflicts, 
the underlying relationship can be understood as a permanent relationship among group of 
citizens and the local authority. Second, in the case of mining firms, some authors have 
argued that citizens that live within the same geographical area of the mining firm perceive 
the relationship among the citizens and the mining firm as a long-term relationship (Perla, 
2016; Salas, 2004) 
A strategy in the static or stage game is only an action. However, a strategy in the infinitely 
repeated game specifies an action for every contingency and for every time in which a 
player is called to play. Hence, and strategy specifies all actions that will be taken from 
today and in the future. Consequently, the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game are the 
sum of the discounted payoffs of each stage played today and in the future. For instance, if 
the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game are the same value 𝑘 on each period, the total 
payoff of that infinitely repeated game will be the following sum: 𝑘 + 𝑘𝛿9 + 𝑘𝛿: + ⋯ =
<
=>?
 . Here 𝛿 is the time discount factor that indicates that players are impatient, or that they 
value their present payoffs more than their future payoffs. The average payoff of the 
infinitely repeated game is the average payoff obtained in all periods. For instance, if the 
payoff is the same value 𝑘 in every period of the game, the average payoff of the infinitely 
repeated game will be also 𝑘.  
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A SPNE for the infinitely repeated game can be one in which each player choses the action 
that corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium of the stage game on each period. This SPNE 
would imply an average payoff equal to the payoff of the NE of the stage game for each 
player. For instance, when the strategies of the Nash equilibrium (~𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐹) of the stage 
game are played on each repetition of the game, the average payoffs of the infinitely 
repeated game are the same of the stage game,  (0 − 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,). It is 
possible, however, to obtain a higher average payoff than the NE payoff for each player in 
the infinitely repeated game.  
The Folk theorem (Fudemberg and Maskin, 1986) establishes that any feasible13 payoff of 
the stage game with higher payoffs than the payoffs of the NE can be sustained as the 
average payoff of a SPNE of the infinitely repeated game. I use the this result to argue that 
in the infinitely repeated game we can obtain average payoffs 4𝑅( − 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏), 𝑃(𝜏)5. These 
payoffs,  are pareto superior to (0 − 𝜏, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,, 𝑃(𝜏) − 𝐶,). 
One way in which this can be achieved is by using a trigger strategy. A trigger strategy 
specifies a cooperation action and a punishment action. The punishment can be a 
punishment forever in which case the strategy is called a grim trigger strategy, or the 
punishment can be temporary. As mentioned before, a temporary punishment is more 




~𝐺		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑇	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 Y for the RC …. (1) 
 
 
13 The set of feasible payoffs of the static game are any vector of payoffs observed in Table 1 and the 





~𝐹 𝑖𝑓	𝑂. 𝐶. 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒	𝐺
𝐹		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑇	𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 Y for groups 𝑖 = {𝐴, 𝐵}. ………….. (2) 
 
I call this strategy as the “Temporary Punishment” strategy. With  𝑇  sufficiently large and 
a discount factor (𝛿) sufficiently close to one, the discounted payoff of deviating is smaller 
than the discounted payoff of cooperating.  Intuitively, a temporary punishment strategy is 
equivalent to an agreement that stablishes the cooperation conditions and a period of 
punishment in case the agreement is violated. Furthermore, since this agreement is a SPNE, 
the players do not have incentives to deviate unilaterally, it is a self-enforced agreement. 
In the following section of this chapter a introduce The Contrasting Coordination Effects 
of Social Capital model (CCESC). The CCSESC makes use of the infinitely repeated 
protester’s dilemma to advance further in the analysis of conflicts at the local level. I will 
use the equilibrium concepts that include “Temporary Punishment” strategies in the 
infinitely repeated protester’s dilemma to analyze what occurs when players move from 
one equilibrium to another as a consequence of a wealth increasing exogenous shock. I 
argue that conflict occur in moving from one equilibrium to another. 
 
2.3 The Contrasting Coordination Effects of Social Capital Model 
The CCESC model uses as baseline the infinitely repeated protester’s dilemma. Briefly 
summarized, the CCESC model describes the movement from an old temporary 
punishment equilibrium to a new one after an exogenous wealth increasing shock.  After 
the wealth increasing shock, the Folk theorem establishes that an infinite number of 
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temporary punishment subgame perfect Nash equilibria exists, but it does not indicate 
which one will be chosen among the myriad of possible equilibria.  
Ferejhon (1990) argues that in the context of multiple equilibria, it is possible to suggest 
the equilibrium that will result if we know the pattern of beliefs in a society. This is possible 
because a common set of beliefs helps to coordinate actions towards an equilibrium that is 
consistent with those beliefs. Thus, choosing among many kinds of equilibria is basically 
a coordination problem. In the CCESC model, conflict and social capital are both of crucial 
importance to coordinate and determine the new resulting equilibrium.  
As defined previously, social capital refers to features of social organizations, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions. Communities that inherited a substantial stock of social capital find voluntary 
cooperation easier often due to shared norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement (Putnam, 1993:167). Based on this definition, I argue that social capital helps 
to coordinate both common beliefs about legitimate claims and the collective actions to 
obtain those claims. Coordinated actions are particularly possible if the beliefs entail that 
the benefits obtained from the powerful actor will be redistributed evenly among all 
members at the local level because no member will feel aggrieved by how the payoffs are 
assigned.  
In the following subsection, I theorize the process when an exogenous wealth-increasing 
shock occurs, how it generates conflict, the contrasting role of social capital, and its 
effects in transfers and public policy. Finally, I infer some testable propositions from the 
theory.   
Dynamics after an Exogenous Wealth-Increasing Shock in the CCESC model 
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In this section I analyze the different dynamic paths that can occur after an exogenous 
wealth-increasing shock using as baseline the infinitely repeated protester’s dilemma. I 
focus on a type of social change that increases the wealth available to the receiver of claims 
at the local level.14  First, I summarize the assumptions underlying the analysis. 
Assumptions 
1. At the local level, a set of informal institutions operate in the form of informal 
agreements. These informal agreements can be described as containing temporary 
punishment strategies among the receiver of claims and the claimants. 
2. When an exogenous wealth increasing social change occurs within a 
geographical area, the new resources available are always under the control of the 
receiver of claims. However, the other inhabitants of the area will feel entitled to 
benefit from the new resources.  
3. There are two types of receivers of claims. The first type is an internal receiver 
of claims that belongs to the same geographic space as the claimants and has 
knowledge about the type of informal rules at the local level, the shared norms of 
reciprocity, and networks of civic engagement at the local level. The second type 
is an external receiver of claims that is relatively new to the same geographic space 
than the claimants. The external receiver does not know much about the type of 
informal rules that operate at the local level nor about the shared norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement that also operate at the local level. 
The claimants are always internal to the geographic space. 
 
14 Examples of this type of social change are increments in the prices of natural resources or increments in 





4.  Social capital is useful to transfer information from internal claimants to internal 
receiver of claims. It is not useful to transfer information to external receiver of 
claims. 
 
The dynamic categories developed by (MacAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2003) are suitable to 
analyze the movement from one equilibrium to another in the CCESC model. The authors 
suggest to divide the dynamics of conflicts in three categories: mechanisms, processes, and 
episodes. Broadly defined, mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations 
among a specified set of elements in an identical or closely similar way over a variety of 
situations. Processes are regular sequences of such mechanisms that also produce 
transformations of those elements. Finally, episodes of contention are sets of concatenated 
processes that can be combined in many different ways and sequences to produce many 
different results (MacAdam, Tarrow and Tilly; 2003:24). Following these authors, I focus 
on processes that are worth being singled out either because they can be measured or 
because they are recurrent processes. A recurrent process means that this process operates 
with great similarity across a myriad of situations. In this section, I discuss processes that 
take place when the actors at a local level are moving from one temporary punishment 
equilibrium to another. Importantly, I focus on processes that will allow for empirical 
validation. In what follows, I describe the two types of processes that, I argue, are recurrent 
processes used to move from one equilibrium to another as consequence of a wealth-





First Process: The Rise of Conflict 
This type of process starts with an exogenous wealth-increasing shock and ends with the 
rise of disruptive events such as protests, boycotts, and strikes at the local level when they 
occur.15  
When the exogenous wealth increasing shock occurs, the set of feasible allocations 
expands. This expansion occurs regardless of the type of the previous equilibrium. The 
exogenous wealth-increasing shock does not make the citizen groups necessarily worse off 
than before. However, I argue that when there is more wealth at the local level, citizen 
groups feel entitled to better public goods from the local government or the resource-
extraction firm. Given that all groups have unfulfilled higher distributional expectations, 
they wish to move to a new equilibrium according to their new expectations (with better or 
more public goods). With complete information, the movement from one equilibrium to 
another should be smooth and fast. With incomplete information, however, reaching a new 
equilibrium will require in many cases engaging in NVR campaigns with disruptive 
actions16 (protest, boycotts, strikes, etc.)   
Reaching a new temporary punishment equilibrium generates both a coordination problem 
and an ascertaining problem. First, trying to reach a new equilibrium creates a coordination 
problem because, although the set of legitimate beliefs has increased for all players, this 
set is not necessarily the same for all individuals. Thus, they need to coordinate the new 
levels of transfers and public goods that all agents find legitimate. Second, this process 
 
15 As I will explain later, in some cases with very high levels of social capital and an internal receiver of 
claims, it is possible that no disruptive events are not observed. Nevertheless, the aggrieved groups will 
make their claims to the receiver of claims. 
16 Until this point my analysis is similar to the relative deprivation argument (Gurr, 1970). Relative 
deprivation is defined as the discrepancy between actor’s expectations of rightful entitlements and their 




creates an ascertaining problem because it is necessary to calculate an optimal punishment 
period, 𝑇, such that all agents, particularly the receiver of claims, will choose to cooperate 
instead of defect. Information to solve the coordination and ascertaining problems can be 
transmitted in two ways: by engaging in conflict and through social capital. 
Engaging in conflict or disruptive events helps to transfer information about the 
capacity of the claimants to punish the receiver of claims by showing their capacity to 
“fight” or “resist”. For instance, prolonged initial blockades, boycotts, or strikes indicate 
that the punishment period for not following a new agreement will also be long. Hence, 
episodes of contention help to ascertain the size of the punishment (the number T of periods 
in the temporary punishment strategy in equation 2) and make future sanctions credible for 
the receiver of claims. Without contention, ascertaining a temporary punishment strategy 
that is a credible commitment will be less likely. 
Social capital not only helps to coordinate collective actions, but also helps to 
directly transfer information about the claimants’ capacity to fight and resist without 
engaging in actual conflict. I argue that social capital helps to transfer this type of 
information only to an internal receiver of claims. One way this could happen is through 
regular meetings or assemblies that are normal in organizations at the local level. These 
meetings can serve as means to make decisions and transfer information to the local 
political authority. Social capital can also help to transfer information to the local political 
authority if the local political authority has previously observed the capacity of the social 
organizations to engage in collective actions. 
 Social capital will not be helpful to directly transfer information (without engaging 
in actual conflict) to an external receiver of claims. This might occur because there are not 
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pre-existing networks that link claimants with the external receiver of claims or because 
the external receiver of claims does not initially attribute legitimacy to the organizations 
and informal rules that operate at the local level.  
Thus, to summarize, social capital can help in the process of moving towards a new 
equilibrium in two ways: directly, by using the existing social networks that are part of 
social capital to transfer direct information to the receiver of claims  (internal only) or 
indirectly by improving the claimant’s  capacity to generate actual collective disruptive 
actions which in turn will inform the receiver of claims (internal or external) about the 
capacity of the claimants to fight and resist. 
These two ways in which social capital helps to transfer information and move 
towards a new equilibrium have important implications for the relationship of social capital 
with conflict. 
 
Social capital and conflict with an internal receiver of claims.  
If at the local level there are higher levels of social capital, two things happen. First, since 
the receiver of claims is internal, he will have information about levels of social capital and 
consequently will know that the claimants have an elevated capacity to make him comply 
with a new agreement due to their high capacity to organize collective actions. Second, the 
networks included in the social capital will transfer information to the receiver of claims 
about the new desired legitimate equilibrium (which includes the new levels of transfers or 
public goods, and punishment in case of defection). These two characteristics will decrease 
the number of iterations with disruptive events required to reach an agreement. The 
following proposition summarizes this analysis: 
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Proposition 1. In locations affected by an exogenous wealth-increasing shock 
where the receiver of claims is internal, the effect of the shock on the number 
and intensity of the episodes of disruptive contention (boycotts, protest, 
organized noncooperation, etc.) will depend negatively17 on the existent levels 
of social capital in that location.  
 
 
Social capital and conflict with an external receiver of claims.  
When there is an external receiver of claims, he might not have information about the 
existence of the networks and organizations that are part of social capital. Even when the 
RC learns about the existence of these organizations, it is hard for the RC to know the 
actual capacity of these organizations and networks to coordinate actions to engage in 
collective actions. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the networks and organizations can 
transfer information to the receiver of claims but if they manage to do so, it is also unlikely 
that the RC will give legitimacy to these organizations. Therefore, if at the local level there 
are higher levels of social capital, the only way the citizens of these organizations can 
transfer information about their capacity to engage in collective actions is by actually 
engaging in disruptive events. The higher the levels of social capital, the higher the 
numbers of iterations in which the organizations can and will perform disruptive events to 
show their capacity to “fight and resist.” On the contrary, if at the local level there are lower 
levels of social capital it would be harder for local organizations and networks to sustain 
disruptive events in many iterations. The following proposition summarizes this analysis: 
 
17 Here I am referring to a negative interaction relationship: the higher the level of social capital, the 
smaller the effect of the shock on the episodes of disruptive contention. 
 
 35 
Proposition 2. In locations affected by an exogenous wealth-increasing shock, 
the effect of the shock on the number and intensity of the episodes of disruptive 
contention (boycotts, protest, organized noncooperation, etc.) will depend 
positively18 on the existent levels of social capital in that location.  
 
Second Process: The effects of Conflict 
The analysis made in this subsection applies for conflicts in which the receiver of claim 
can be either internal or external. Here I focus on the recurrent process that occurs after the 
disruptive contentious episodes (blockades, boycotts, protest, organized noncooperation, 
etc.). This process starts with the rise of disruptive events and continues until a new 
equilibrium is reached. As mentioned before, a new equilibrium is a new agreement which 
includes both cooperation actions and a temporary punishment in case of defection. The 
cooperation actions, assuming an equilibrium as the one described in equations (1) and (2), 
include more and better public goods than before. Furthermore, this new equilibrium often 
entails equal benefits to all citizen groups. In terms of the stage game in section 2.2, a 
profile of strategies like what I call the “socially desirable profile” (𝐺, ~𝐹, ~𝐹) fits our 
description of a legitimate profile since the receiver of claims is redistributing the resources 
evenly among citizens groups and there is no social cost due to social unrest. 
In more or less intensity, engaging in actual conflicts was necessary to move to a new 
equilibrium. For this reason, it can be argued that conflict can “cause” pareto superior 
agreements19 or concessions from the receiver of claims. Furthermore, if it is used in a 
 
18 18 Here I am referring to a positive interaction relationship: the higher the level of social capital, the 
greater the effect of the shock on the episodes of disruptive contention. 
19 To achieve a pareto superior agreement means that at least one player is better off and the others 
are the same as before. In the context of the stage game, this means an equilibrium in which all citizen groups 
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context with sufficiently high levels of social capital, obtaining more transfers and better 
public goods is more likely. The following proposition summarizes this analysis: 
Proposition 3. In locations affected by an exogenous wealth increasing shock, 
regardless of whether the receiver of claims is internal or external, the effect of 
disruptive contentions on transfers and/or better provision of public goods will 
depend positively on the existent levels of social capital in that location.  
 
 Not all observed contention will necessarily lead to a pareto superior equilibrium. In 
localities where social capital is scarce, contentious events might not be coordinated even 
if they individually point to similar distributional arrangements that would otherwise 
represent legitimate levels of redistribution. It can also be the case that some observed 
contentious events are caused by narrow interest groups looking for group benefits that are 
not general and consequently will be unable to achieve legitimacy.  In these cases, 









are better off or receive more and better policies which include better provision of public goods. In other 




Chapter 3: The Dual Role of Social Capital on Conflict: Evidence 
from Peasant Communities in Perú 
 
In this chapter, I use the CCESC model to analyze contentious episodes that occurred in 
Peru from 2006 to 2011. Contentious events for the whole country are summarized in 
monthly reports by the Peruvian Ombudsman Agency (OA). From these reports, I created 
a dataset that includes more than 736 episodes of contention for the period 2006-2011. The 
Ombudsman Agency refers to its monthly reports as “Social Conflict Reports.” Thus, the 
contentious cases are called “social conflicts.”20 Although it is possible to observe some 
violence in these conflicts, these conflicts are of low intensity. Moreover, many of the 
disruptive events that take place in these conflicts fit with the concepts of boycotts, strikes, 
and protest which are included in the definition of nonviolent resistance.  
During the period of study of this chapter, the Peruvian economy enjoyed high levels of 
economic growth importantly fueled by the resource extraction sector. This period of 
growth allowed the central government to transfer important amounts of resources to 
subnational local governments (these transfers are called “Canon Revenues”). However, 
despite of these windfalls, the number of episodes of contention with disruptive events also 






20 The official definition of a conflict according to the “Defensoria” establishes the following conditions: i) 
Incidents that threaten health, or life of individuals, ii) Damage public or private property,  iii) Obstruct 









The OA classifies social conflicts in eleven types. In this chapter, I focus on the two main 
types. These two types are named local conflicts and mining conflicts. A local conflict is 
defined by the OA as one in which citizens or organizations of citizens have claims over 
the resources available to the local government, whereas a mining conflict is defined as a 
conflict in which citizens or organizations of citizens have claims over the resources 
available to the resource-extraction firm. These two types of conflicts account for around 
53% of the total number of conflicts.  I focus on these two types of conflicts because they 
fit conceptually with the two types of conflicts that the CCESC model analyses. The RC in 
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external agent, given that almost all the big mining projects are developed by multinational 
companies. The claimants in a mining conflict are always internal as in the CCESC. On 
the other hand, the RC in a local conflict is always internal since local authorities have to 
be elected among the people that live in the district.  
In these two types of conflicts, the RC was affected by an exogenous wealth-increasing 
social change during the period of this study. In this period, the international prices of the 
main mineral commodities exported by the Peruvian economy increased. These favorable 
increments translated directly or indirectly to both the mining companies and the local 
political authorities. The mining companies experienced an increase on their wealth either 
because what they produced was worth more or because, taking advantage of the high 
prices, they elevated their extraction quantities, as well. The local governments had more 
resources due to higher canon transfers. The canon transfer’s law established that 50% of 
the profit taxes payed by the mining companies should be transferred to the regional and 
local governments in the province (a province is composed of many local governments). 
Therefore, not only the local government in which the mine is located benefited from canon 
transfers but all the local governments of the province in which the resource was extracted. 
For this reason, the number of districts prone to the occurrence of a mining conflict is 
smaller than the number of districts prone to the occurrence of a local conflict. However, 
the number of local conflicts is considerable smaller than the number of mining conflicts 




Figure 3. Two Main types of Conflicts, 2006-2011. Source: Ombudsman Agency. 
  
How can we explain this pattern? The CCESC model provides, in part, an answer to this 
question.  The CCESC model predicts that social capital can have contrasting effects on 
conflicts, increasing the necessity of disruptive episodes in one type of conflict but also 
decreasing the necessity of disruptive episodes in other types of conflicts. 
 
Although social capital is hard to observe and measure (Ostrom, 2002), I argue the 
Peruvian context allows us to study the role of social capital on contentious politics by 
focusing on the role that peasant communities play in conflicts at the local level. Peasant 
communities are the main form of organizations in the rural space (Diez, 2010). According 
to the 2012 agrarian census (CENAGRO) there are 6,115 peasant communities in Perú 
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have a diversity of origins. In some regions of the country, the existence of peasant or 
indigenous communities, as they were called before, can be traced back to the colonial era. 
Peasant communities have three main characteristics: i) they hold communal property 
rights and shared use over land, ii) there are bonds of reciprocity and kinship among the 
members, and iii) they have an internal organization to take decisions and choose their 
leadership (Diez, 1999). Furthermore, peasant communities have a typical form of 
organization to take decisions and to defend communal interests that has been formally 
institutionalized in the Peasant Communities Law N° 24656. This law also institutionalizes 
the main principles underlying the life of peasant communities. Among these principles, 
the reciprocity, the solidarity, and the defense of common interests are relevant to 
understand peasant communities as social organizations that use and reproduce social 
capital. In section 3.1.3 I will explain in detail my reasons to argue that peasant 
communities are valid measures of social capital. In addition to the Peruvian peasant 
communities, there are also around six more types of social organizations that entail 
networks of reciprocity and rules of civil engagement, I will present this organizations in 
detail in section 3.1.3. 
The Peruvian political context has two additional characteristics that are compatible 
with the setup of the CCESC model. First, since the early 90s, the Peruvian political context 
lacks a consolidated party system. The economic crises of the 80s hindered the trust of the 
population in the ability of traditional parties to provide answers to the myriad of economic 
and political problems of Peruvian society. Later, the consolidation of Fujimori’s regime 
after the 1992 self-coup signaled that parties were not necessary for political success 
(Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). In consequence, political parties in Peru are almost non-
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existent. Parties are created in election years and disappear after elections. The lack of 
parties implies that aggrieved groups cannot use parties to channel their claims, which 
make  disruptive collective actions (such as those included in the CCESC model) an 
important option to obtain concessions. 
 The second characteristic of the Peruvian context that makes it suitable to be analyzed 
with the CCESC model is the period of study of this dissertation (2006-2011). This period 
occurs after the collapse of President Fujimori’s regime. This is a period that has been 
characterized as a more democratic period compared with Fujimori’s period. It is more 
democratic in the sense that less repression from central government is expected (Dargent 
et. Al. 2017; Arce, 2014).  Protests like those described by the CCESC model are more 
likely in democracy than in a dictatorship or in a competitive authoritarian regime as the 
Fujimori’s government has been categorized. 
 Given these favorable characteristics of the Peruvian context, the rest of the chapter 
evaluates empirically the first two predictions of the CCESC model.  In section 3.1, I 
describe the data and the operationalizations of the variables that will be used in sections 
3.2 and 3.3. In section 3.2, I present my empirical strategy and the results obtained of 
evaluating Proposition 1 of the CCESC model.  In section 3.3, I test Proposition 2 of the 
CCESC model. Finally, in section 3.4, I discuss with some detail the Peasant Communities 





3.1 Data and Sources 
The Peruvian Polity is organized at four geographical levels: i) The national level which 
refers to the whole country, ii) the department level that has 24 departments, iii) the 
province level which includes 195 provinces, and iv) the district level which includes 
around 1800 districts. The unit of observation in the empirical analysis of section 3.2.  is 
the year-district. In the rest of this subsection I will describe the data sources used in the 
empirical analysis and the variables that will be constructed at the level of the unit of 
observation (year- district). 
 
3.1.1 Conflict Data 
The Peruvian Ombudsman Agency (OA) collects data about contention episodes. This 
agency refers to the contentious episodes as social conflicts. A social conflict is defined as 
a public confrontation among actors that look to influence the organization of social 
life.21 
The OA publishes monthly reports on social conflicts (Reporte de Conflictos Sociales). 
These reports cover the period from 2004 to 2011. Information is collected by local offices 
(38 in total) distributed across all of Peru. Each report identifies the list of on-going cases 
of social conflict and provides a brief description of events as well as the location of the 
conflict up to district level22.  
 
21 Defensoria del Pueblo. Ante todo, el Diálogo. Defensoria del Pueblo y Conflictos socales y Políticos 
(2005) 
22 See appendix 1 for examples of the summaries presented for two conflicts. 
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 The reports define social conflict in a broad sense. The definition includes any public 
confrontation that 
  
o Involve incidents that threaten health, or life of individuals, or 
o  Damage public or private property, or 
o Obstruct the movement of people, or 
o Obstruct public activities or provision of public goods. 
 
The OA classifies conflicts as “active” from the moment in which it gathers the information 
that an event has occurred until the parties in conflict reach an agreement, or until the OA 
considers a conflict inactive.  Using this classification, I constructed what I call the “Active 
Conflict” indicator. This indicator is measured monthly for each conflict. The reports may 
indicate that there is an active social conflict in a given period, even though there were no 
“disruptive” or “collective action” events in that month. For this reason, in addition to the 
classification provided by OA about active conflicts, I used the summaries of all events 
that occurred in a conflict during a given month to construct an indicator of actual 
disruptive events (See Appendix 1 for examples of these summaries). I call this indicator 
the “Disruptive event” indicator. To create the “Disruptive event” indicator, I search for 
specific keywords in the description of each event in a given month. The keywords are: 
o Events that involved demonstration of discontent or stopping of normal activities.  
§ Keywords: movilizacion, protesta, marcha, mitin, paro, huelga 
o Events that limited or restricted the use of private/public property  
 
 45 
§ Keywords: toma de local, bloque de carretera, desalojo, invasion, 
cierre de local, impedimento, lacradao, cerrado 
o Events that damaged private/public property 
§ Keywords: quema, vandalism, daño 
o Events that involved attacks to individual freedom or physical aggression 
§ Keywords: aggression, enfrentamiento, secuestro, asesinato herido, 
apedreamineto, fallecido, muerto, homicidio 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the two indicators described above for the 
main six types of conflicts as defined by the OA. The most common type is environmental 
conflicts. This chapter analyzes the mining conflicts and the local conflicts. As explained 
earlier, I created the mining conflict type, which is defined as a conflict in which citizens 
or organizations of citizens have claims over the resources available to the resource-
extraction firm. The OA included all the conflicts that I have classified as mining conflicts 
within the environmental type. A local conflict is defined by the OA as one in which 
citizens or organization of citizens have claims over the resources available to the local 
government. 
Interestingly, local conflicts are normally active for less time than mining conflicts. On 
average, a local conflict is active 8.5 months whereas mining conflicts are active 15.49 
months (see values in the “Mean” column and rows 2 and 3 of Panel A in Table 3). In the 
same line, for the number of months in which a collective action or a disruptive event was 
registered, local conflicts have, on average, 1.32 months whereas mining conflicts have 
1.73 months (see values in the “Mean” column and rows 2 and 3 of Panel B in Table 3). 
Thus, mining conflicts have 31% more months with disruptive events or collective actions 
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than local conflicts. Jointly, these two factors suggest that mining conflicts are longer and 
more violent than local conflicts. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the Number of Months a Conflict was Active 
by    Type of Conflict (2006-2011) 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Environmental 255 16.81 14.28 1 82 
Mining* 215 15.49 14.27 1 82 
Local 177 8.50 6.87 1 38 
Labor 87 9.83 10.51 1 46 
Region 42 7.23 6.77 1 26 
National 39 18.1 13.24 1 47 
Others 136 6.9 5.57 1 28 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the Number of Months a Conflict had a 
Collective Action or Disruptive Event by Type of Conflict 
 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Environmental 255 1.54 2.16 0 18 
Mining* 215 1.73 2.38 0 18 
Local 177 1.32 1.58 0 12 
Labor 87 2.05 2.45 0 11 
Region 42 1.38 0.94 0 4 
National 39 2.28 2.97 0 12 
Others 136 1.59 1.13 0 7 
*The mining conflict type is my own classification; all these conflicts are included in the 
Environmental conflicts. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Number of Months a Conflict was Active by 
Type of Conflict (2006-2011) 
 
Using these two raw measures from Table 3, I will construct the variables used in the 
empirical analysis of section 3.2.  Two variables will be constructed for each type of 
conflict (Mining and local). The first variable is the number of months that conflicts were 
active in a district during a year. For instance, if district 𝑖 had two active conflicts during 
year 𝑡	in which one of them was active for seven months but the other was active for only 
three months, the conflict variable for district 𝑖	in year 𝑡 will be 10. I call this variable 
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“conflict indicator 1,” 𝐶1Z,^. In the analysis of section 3.2., 𝐶1Z,^ will be either 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶Z,^  
for local conflicts or 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁Z,^  for mining conflicts.  The second variable is constructed to 
also take into account actual disruptive episodes that occurred in a district. This second 
variable is obtained in two steps. The first step calculates, similar to the first variable, the 
number of months that conflicts have disruptive events in a district during a year. The 
second step takes the average of the number calculated in the first step and the first variable 
(𝐶1Z,^). Thus, the second variable considers both how active the conflicts in a district were 
and how disruptive these conflicts were.  I call this second variable as “conflict indicator 
2,” 𝐶2Z,^. The two variables described are, I argue, good indicators of how many iterations 
the conflicts had in a district and how many of these iterations were disruptive.    
 
3.1.2 Windfall Revenue Data 
I use data from the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) on transfers to local 
governments from years 2003-2011. As a measure of the revenue windfall, I use the log of 
the per-capita “canon minero” received by a district 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐶Z,^. The “canon 
minero” is a tax-sharing scheme that transfers 50% of mines’ corporate taxes to local 
governments. These transfers benefit all districts in the province and the department in 
which the mine is located. The amount each district receives is based on an exogenous pre-
established formula. The preestablished formula divides the corporate tax as follows: 10% 
to the local government in which the mine is located; 25% for local governments within 
the same province in which the mine is located; 40% to local governments within the same 
department in which the mine is located; 25% to the department’s governorship. In 
principle, canon revenues should mainly affect to local conflicts since canon revenues are 
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transfers to local governments. However, I will argue that canon revenues also inform 
citizens and organizations of citizens at the local level if the wealth of the mining firms at 
the local level has increased. As a robustness check, I also constructed a variable that 
measures directly the resources available to the mining firm. This variable is the log of the 
per-capita value of the minerals produced in district 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑉𝑃Z,^. The Ministry of 
Energy and Mines publishes monthly reports which include the production of each mine, 
the location of the mine, and the type of mineral extracted (Gold, Copper, Silver, etc.) 
Multiplying each type of mineral produced by its corresponding international price will 
provide the value produced of that mineral. Finally, if more than one mineral is produced 
in a district, the value of all the minerals is added. 
 
3.1.3 Social Capital Data  
In the Peruvian context, two sources are used to build indicators of social capital at the 
district level. The main source is CEPES’ 2016 peasant communities’ yearbook from which 
I obtained information about the number and geographical spread of peasant communities 
in each district. The second source is the National Municipal Registry (RENAMU) from 
which I obtained information about six additional social organizations at the district level. 
The main analysis focuses in peasant communities in section 3.2. Section 3.3 adds to the 
analysis the social capital indicators obtained from the RENAMU survey. The effects of 
peasant communities found in section 3.2 do not change after the inclusion of the variables 
obtained from the RENAMU survey. Doubtless, there can be other sources of social capital 





Peasant communities are the main form of organizations in the rural space (Diez, 2010). 
According to the 2012 agrarian census (CENAGRO) there are 6,115 peasant communities 
in Perú which have a territorial extension of around 19,888,192.22 ha. The peasant 
communities have a diversity of origins. In some regions of the country, the existence of 
peasant or indigenous communities, as they were previously known, can be traced back to 
colonial times. Peasant communities have three main characteristics: i) they hold 
communal property rights and shared use over land, ii) there are bonds of reciprocity and 
kinship among the members, and iii) they have an internal organization to take decisions 
and choose their leadership (Diez, 1999). Peasant communities have a typical form of 
organization to take decisions and to defend their interests. This organizational structure 
has been formally institutionalized in the Peasant Communities Law N° 24656.  This law, 
establishes, in its 17th article, that the general assembly is the supreme deliberation 
authority within the community. The assembly also appoints the members of the directory 
(president, vice president, secretary, etc.) The general assembly meets periodically to 
discuss communal issues. Also, the third article of the peasant communities’ law 
establishes that peasant communities abide principles of reciprocity, solidarity, and the 
defense of common interests. In line with these principles, a recent study that analyses 
peasant communities located in the Ocongate district in Cuzco, argues that the main 
observed objectives of peasant communities are administration and defense of communal 
resources (which include the land, the local government transfers, and NGO’s transfers); 
the representation of the community before state and private institutions; and the solution 
of conflicts within the communities, Rosas (2016: 436). Given all these characteristics of 
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peasant communities, I argue that they are social organizations that represent the existence 
of social capital at the local level. 
Organized peasant communities have been registering in the national agency for registering 
property (SUNARP) during the last 100 years. Moreover, peasant communities register 
their rights to the use of lands measure in hectares.  
Based on this, I construct two variables that measure the extent and importance of peasant 
communities within a district. The first variable is the number of registered peasant 
communities within district 𝑖, 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛Z. Under the assumption that the number of 
communities is not too large, I argue that more peasant communities imply more social 
capital within a district. The second variable is the total number of hectares that peasant 
communities managed to register in the official records in millions of hectares, 𝐻𝑎Z. Under 
the assumption that bigger peasant communities will register higher extensions of land, 
more hectares are also an indicator of more social capital. In the empirical analysis of 
section 3.2, I consider only peasant communities that registered until 2005, previous to the 
period of study of this dissertation (2006-2011). 
 
Other Social Organizations from RENAMU’s Survey 
In the RENAMU survey, municipal authorities answer pre-determined questions about the 
number of at least six types of social organizations. The survey also includes information 
about the number of members that obtain benefits from each type of these organizations. I 




• Mother’s Clubs. These are organizations composed of women that have 
common interests to obtain benefits for their children.  
• Glass of Milk. These are organizations that prepare breakfasts that include 
a glass of milk for their members. 
• Communal Kitchens. These are organizations that prepare lunch for free or 
a very low prices for their members. 
• Wawa Wasi. These are organizations that provide care for children of their 
female working members. 
• Elderly Clubs. These are organizations composed of elderly people. 
• Young. Clubs. These are organizations formed by young people. 
• Other types. Any other types of social organizations. 
 
Similar to Putnam’s (1993) use of chorus rehearsal and soccer organizations as indicators 
of social capital in Italy, the organizations described in the RENAMU’s survey can also be 
considered as indicators of social capital at the district level. Therefore, for each district I 
created two variables related to these organizations. The first variable is the aggregation of 
the seven categories described above, the total number of social organizations in the 
districts. The second variable is the total number of people that obtain benefits from the 
organizations mentioned above. 
The social organizations in the list above have very specific objectives, they mainly focus 
on addressing nutritional problems or providing child care to disadvantaged groups of the 
population, it is unlikely that once these organization have fulfilled their specific concerns 
they will focus on other matters at the local level. 
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Instead, peasant communities focus on a wider set of issues that include many political 
issues at the local level that involve dealing with private (i.e. mining firms) and public 
institutions (i.e. local governments). For this reason, I section 3.2 the main analysis uses 
only peasant communities as the most relevant measure of social capital to the analysis of 
mining and local conflicts. Nevertheless, in section 3.3.1 the empirical analysis includes 
both measures of social capital (peasant communities and the other social organizations) 
as a robustness check. In this analysis the contrasting effects of peasant communities’ 
social capital on conflict holds. 
 
 
3.1.4 Other Control Variables  
Non-parametric trend indicators of above the mean value for a set of socioeconomic 
characteristics are also added to the analysis. These variables include the size of poor, rural, 
and total population, population density, access to drinking water, access to sanitation, and 
share of the population which completed elementary and high school. All of this 
information was obtained from the 2007 Census.  For the local conflict’s estimation, I 
added the share of votes obtained by the winner in the most recent election. This variable 
will serve as a measure of the support that the local mayor has within a district. Below, in 









 Mean SD Obs. Min Max. 
Conflict Ind.1 Local, 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶	 0.11 1.01 11163 0 24 
Conflict Ind.2 Local, 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶	 0.06 0.55 11163 0 14.5 
Conflict Ind.1Mining, 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁 0.39 2.10 11163 0 35 
Conflict Ind. 2 Mining, 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁 0.21 1.13 11163 0 18 
Log-Mining canon per capita (PEN) 3.78 2.34 9702 0 10.20 
Log-Min. Output Value per capita (PEN) 0.37 1.83 9738 0 14.8 
Number of Registered Peasant Communities 
until 2005 
2.73 5.1 11163 0 83 
Peasant Communities’ Hectares with Prop. 
Rights (Millions) 
0.13 0.024 11163 0 0.28 
Number of Social Organizations in the 
RENAMU Survey (2005) 
52.73 145.66 11163 0 3502 
Number of Beneficiaries of Social 
Organizations in the RENAMU Survey (2005) 
3446 10002 11163 34 191993 
Share of the Population with a Non-Spanish 
native language (2007) 
0.30 0.35 11163 0 0.99 
% Rural Poverty (2007) 51.7 30.6 11004 0 99 
% Poverty headcount (2007) 51.3 23.8 11004 0 98 
% has piped water (2007) 42.5 32.01 10992 0 99 
% has indoor sewage (2007) 22.6 24.52 10992 0 100 
% of the population which completed 
elementary School 
81.53 7.1 10992 36.7 97.7 
% of the population which completed High 
School 
39.2 15.5 10992 3.7 87.1 
% votes winner local government in recent 
elections 
33.6 10.6 10811 12.7 100 
Recall Process (Dummy) 0.0271 0.1625 11302 0 1 
Successful Recall Process (Dummy) 0.0134 0.1152 11302 0 1 
 




3.2 Testing the Contrasting Effects of Social Capital on Conflict, The CCESC Model 
3.2.1 The Effects of Social Capital on Local Conflicts 
In this subsection I test Proposition 1 of the CCESC model. Proposition 1 establishes a 
negative interactive relationship between the exogenous wealth indicator and social capital 
when affecting local conflicts. A negative interactive relationship between two independent 
variables means that the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable 
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decreases with the values of the other independent variable (𝑆𝐶Z). In terms of the variables 
that will be used to test Proposition 1, a negative interactive relationship means that the 
effect of the log of canon per-capita will be smaller the higher the number of peasant 
communities in a district (or the extent of the hectares that belong to peasant communities 
in the district). This effect can be tested by estimating the following linear equation: 
 
𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ = 𝛽h + 𝛽=𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= ∙ 𝑆𝐶Z + 𝛿𝑋Z^ + 𝛼Z + 𝜃Z^ + 𝛾^
+ 𝑣Z^ …… . . . . (3) 
 
In equation (3) above,  𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ is one of the two local conflict indicators discussed in 
section 3.1.1.,  𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= is the log of the canon per-capita in the previous year, 𝑆𝐶Z is 
one of the two social capital indicators discussed in section 3.1.3, 𝑋Z^ is a set of controls, 
𝛼Z and 𝛾^	are district and year fixed effects. If Proposition 1 is supported by the data, the 
estimated value of the parameter 𝛽9 should be negative and statistically significant. As 
mentioned earlier, the Canon is mainly driven by international prices of mineral 
commodities and by an exogenous tax-sharing scheme. For this reason, I argue that the 
canon revenues are not correlated with other non-observable characteristics of the districts. 
During the period of study, canon revenues were transferred to the local governments in 
June of each year after the mining firms payed their taxes in April.  These transfers could 
be affected by conflicts occurring in the first four months of the year23 if for some reason 
mining firms change their reported profits as consequence of conflictive situations. This 
 
23  Keep in mind that 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ measures the number of months that a local conflict was active during the 
year 𝑡 but it does not specify in which quarter of the year the conflicts were active. 
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could cause a simultaneity bias to the estimation of 𝛽=. To address this concern, I use the 
log of the canon per-capita but in the previous year (𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= )  in the estimation of 
equation (3). I also include district fixed effects to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
fixed in time as well as year fixed effects to account for shocks that affected similarly to 
all districts in the same year. I have also included non-parametric trends such as year fixed 
effects interacted with indicators of above the mean value for the set of socioeconomic 
characteristics described in section 3.1.4. Finally, I included the margin of victory of the 
winner in the most recent election to measure the degree of support that the local 
government has from the population. In Table 5, I present the results of the estimation of 
equation (3) for different measures of conflict and social capital.  In the first four columns, 
the dependent variable is the number of months in which a district had active conflicts 
during a given year, 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶. The last four columns show the results for the estimations 
considering as dependent variable the conflict indicator that also takes into account 
disruptive measures, 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶. Odd columns do not include the non-parametric trends for the 












   
 
Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict Indicator 1 
(𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
Dependent Variable: Local Conflict Indicator 2 
(𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Lagged Log 
of Canon Per 
Capita 0.000451 0.00419 0.00116 0.00292 0.000210 0.00235 0.000125 0.00106 
 (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.00682) (0.00681) (0.00677) (0.00699) 
Lagged Log 




Communities -0.00258*** -0.00296**   -0.00143*** -0.00168**   
 (0.000987) (0.00126)   (0.000533) (0.000665)   
Lagged Log 





’ Hectares   -0.521*** -0.469***   -0.257*** -0.230*** 
   (0.173) (0.167)   (0.0893) (0.0856) 
Non-
Parametric 
Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.0188 0.142 0.0185 0.107 0.0124 0.0692 0.0122 0.0482 
 (0.0330) (0.109) (0.0330) (0.102) (0.0174) (0.0581) (0.0175) (0.0552) 
         
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 
R-squared 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.013 
Number of 
Districts 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Even 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural 
population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
Table 5.  Local Conflict and Social Capital (Peasant Communities) 
 
 
The first two columns show the estimation of equation (3) using the number of peasant 
communities existing in the district as a measure of social capital, in columns 3 and 4 the 
number of hectares registered by peasant communities are used as a measure of social 
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capital. In all these four specifications the estimated values of the interaction parameter 
(𝛽9) are negative and statistically significant. In the estimations presented in columns 5 to 
8 the estimated values of the interaction parameter (𝛽9) are also negative. Thus, the 
evidence supports the existence of a negative interactive effect of the log of per-capita and 
social capital on local NVR campaigns. This result is robust to different measures of 
conflict and social capital. The estimated interactive effect of social capital is large. For 
instance, using specification (2) in table 5, an increment of one standard deviation of the 
log of per-capita canon increases the measure of local conflict (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) in an amount 
equivalent to 9% of the mean value of 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶 when social capital is zero. However, if 
social capital has its mean value (𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛 = 2.73), an increment of one standard deviation 
of the log of per-capita canon decreases the measure of local conflict (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) in an 
amount equivalent to 8.5% of the mean value of 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶. These effects are similar in the 
rest of specifications of equation (3) presented in table 4. 
 
3.2.2. The Effects of Social Capital on Mining Conflicts  
In this subsection, I test empirically Proposition 2 of the CCESC model. Proposition 2 
establishes a positive interactive relationship between the exogenous wealth indicator and 
social capital when affecting mining conflicts.  In terms of the variables used, Proposition 
2 asserts that there exists a positive interactive effect of the log of per-capita and social 
capital on mining conflicts (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁 or 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁). Similar to equation (3), the positive 




𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ = 𝛽h + 𝛽=𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= ∙ 𝑆𝐶Z + 𝛿𝑋Z^ + 𝛼Z + 𝜃Z^ + 𝛾^
+ 𝑣Z^ …… . . . . (4) 
 
In equation 4 above,  𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ is one of the two mining NVR indicators discussed in section 
3.1.1.,  𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^>= is the log of the canon per-capita in the previous year, 𝑆𝐶Z is one of the 
two social capital indicators discussed in section 3.1.3, 𝑋Z^ is a set of controls, 𝛼Z and 𝛾^	are 
district and year fixed effects. If Proposition 2 is supported by the data, the estimated value 
of the parameter 𝛽9 should be positive and statistically significant. 
In Table 6, I present the results of the estimation of equation (4) for different measures of 
conflict and social capital.  In the first four columns, the dependent variable is the number 
of months in which a district had active conflicts during a given year, 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁. The last four 
columns show the results for the estimations considering as dependent variable the conflict 
indicator that also takes into account disruptive measures, 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁. Odd columns do not 
include the non-parametric trends for the socioeconomic characteristics’ controls, while 
even columns do include these controls. 
The first two columns show the estimation of equation (4) using the number of peasant 
communities existing in the district as a measure of social capital, and in columns 3 and 4 
the number of hectares registered by peasant communities are used as measure of social 
capital. In all these four specifications the estimated values of the interaction parameter 
(𝛽9) are positive and statistically significant. In the estimations presented in columns 5 to 
8 the estimated values of the interaction parameter (𝛽9) are also positive. 
The estimated interactive effect of social capital is large. For instance, using specification 
(2) in table 6, an increment of one standard deviation of the log of per-capita canon 
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increases the measure of mining conflict (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) in an amount equivalent to 8.5% of the 
mean value of 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁 when social capital is at its mean value (𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛 = 2.73). 
However, if social capital is at the value of its third quartile (𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛 = 3), an increment 
of one standard deviation of the log of per-capita canon increases the measure of mining 
conflict (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) in an amount equivalent to 15% of the mean value of 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁. These 





















Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict Indicator 1 
(𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict Indicator 2 
(𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita -0.0936** -0.0977** -0.0313 -0.0377 -0.0501** -0.0520** -0.0147 -0.0176 
 (0.0411) (0.0423) (0.0393) (0.0387) (0.0218) (0.0225) (0.0208) (0.0206) 





Communities 0.0397*** 0.0369***   0.0217*** 0.0203***   
 (0.01000) (0.0101)   (0.00541) (0.00548)   






Hectares   3.289*** 3.087***   1.704*** 1.613*** 
   (1.189) (1.148)   (0.634) (0.615) 
Non-
Parametric 
Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.0118 -0.0178 -0.0109 -0.566 -0.00319 -0.0239 -0.00284 -0.260 
 (0.0996) (0.273) (0.101) (0.354) (0.0525) (0.143) (0.0533) (0.179) 
         
Observations 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 
R-squared 0.032 0.038 0.025 0.033 0.031 0.037 0.024 0.031 
Number of 
Districts 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 
 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Even 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as department-by-year fixed effects, and year fixed effects interacted with indicators of 
size of rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education level. 
 
Table 6.  Mining Conflict and Social Capital (Peasant Communities) 
 
As discussed previously, the log of per-capita canon represents the resources available to 
the local governments and not to the mining firms. However, I argued that the canon is a 
variable that also informs citizens about the existence of rents at available mining firms at 
the local level. Despite this, in Table 7, I have done the same empirical analysis of Table 6 
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but instead of using the log of per-capita canon I have used the log of per-capita value of 
the minerals produced in the district as a measure of rents available to mining firms at the 
local level. The underlying assumption of the regressions presented in Table 7 is that citizen 
react directly to the resources available to the mining firm. Regressions 1 to 4 of Table 7 
show the results when the dependent variable is the active mining conflict indicator 
(𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁). In regressions 1 and 2, the interactive terms are positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the interactive terms of regressions 3 and 4 are not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the estimations in Table 7 support Proposition 2 only if social capital 
is measured by the number of peasant communities (𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛). This pattern is also 
observed when estimating 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁.  These results highlight that the positive interactive 















         
 
Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict Indicator 
1 (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict 
Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Lagged Log of The 
Value of Minerals 
Produced Per Capita -0.00146 -0.00334 0.0194 0.0166 -0.000616 -0.00132 0.0125 0.0112 
 (0.0357) (0.0353) (0.0481) (0.0476) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0254) 
(0.0252
) 
Lagged Log of The 
Value of Minerals 
Produced Per Capita 0.0138** 0.0135**   0.00763** 0.00747**   
X Number of 
Communities (0.00635) (0.00627)   (0.00346) (0.00343)   
         
Lagged Log of The 
Value of Minerals 




Hectares   (0.619) (0.600)   (0.365) (0.355) 
         
Non-Parametric 
Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.439*** 0.612*** 0.0217 -0.138 0.237*** 0.328*** 0.0172 -0.0468 
 (0.0402) (0.176) (0.0342) (0.279) (0.0215) (0.0963) (0.0181) (0.147) 
         
Observations 9,738 9,702 9,738 9,702 9,738 9,702 9,738 9,702 
R-squared 0.024 0.032 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.030 0.022 0.030 
Number of Districts 1,623 1,617 1,623 1,617 1,623 1,617 1,623 1,617 
 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Even 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as department-by-year fixed effects, and year fixed effects interacted with indicators 
of size of rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education level. 
Table 7. Mining Conflict and Social Capital (Peasant Communities) 
 
3.3. Robustness Checks 
In this section I address two concerns that arise after observing the results obtained in 
section 3.2. The first concern is that other social organizations that also indicate the 
presence of social capital have not been included in the analysis so far. Do the variables 
indicating the presence of these organizations correlate with peasant communities’ 
indicators? Do the contrasting effects found for peasant communities hold once the other 
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social organizations are included in the regressions? These questions will be answered in 
subsection 3.3.1, in which I will show that the main results of section 3.2 concerning the 
contrasting effects of peasant communities on NVR campaigns are robust to the inclusion 
of additional measures of social capital.   
The second concern is that the contrasting effects of peasant communities on conflict are 
not generated by the peasant communities but by other characteristics that are common in 
peasant communities, such as low education levels, poverty, linguistic differences, etc. If 
this were the case, the observed relationship between peasant communities’ social capital 
and conflict would be a spurious relationship. In section 3.3.2, I address this concern by 
including in the analysis variables commonly related to peasant communities. I show that 
among a set of ten variables, two variables generate similar contrasting effects on conflict. 
However, the contrasting effects of peasant communities on conflict hold after controlling 
for these two variables. 
 
3.3.1 Other Social Organizations  
In this section I consider other social organizations that are also a potential source of social 
capital at the district level. I obtained information about these organizations from the 
RENAMU survey described in section 3.1.3. All these social organizations were created 
during the last 40 years mostly to address the hunger problems created by the recurrent 
economic crises of the late 70’s and 80’s. Thus, these social organizations are relatively 
new compared to peasant communities. Considering all seven types of social organizations 
included in the RENAMU survey, there are around 100 thousand social organizations in 
the whole country. These organizations have around 6.38 million beneficiaries or provide 
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this number of benefits.24 Among this organizations the most numerous are of the “glass 
of milk” type, with 62,631 organizations in the whole country (see Table 8, row 3). The 
Glass of Milk is mainly financed with resources from the central government transferred 
to the local governments. In turn, the local governments transfer the resources to the 62,631 
Glass of Milk organizations in the country. The second most numerous type of social 
organization is the Communal Kitchens with 17,474 organizations in the whole country 
(see Table 8, row 4). The communal kitchens also receive support from the central 
government, but the greater part of their budget is financed by contributions from their 






Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Mother Clubs 10,827 1819 5.65 106.65 0 225 
Glass of Milk 62,361 1819 34.28 25.92 0 2928 
Communal 
Kitchens 
17,474 1819 7.96 12.87 0 472 
Wawa Wasi 6,202 1819 3.41  0 179 
Elderly Clubs 585 1819 0.32 2.6 0 70 
Young Clubs 1,407 1819 0.77 5.18 0 151 
Others 2,203 1819 1.21 12.64 0 360 
 
Table 8. Social Organizations in the RENAMU Survey (2005) 
 
 
24 Many of these reported beneficiaries can be overlapped among different social organizations. Thus, given 
the format of the survey, it is very likely that these social organization  do not reach 6.38 millions of people. 
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Table 9 provides the quantity of beneficiaries of each of the social organizations. 
According to the RENAMU, the Glass of Milk organizations benefit around 4.4 million 
children (see Table 9, row 3), about one sixth of the population. The communal kitchens 
benefit around 900 thousand people (see Table 9, row 4), also an important number. 
As has been described, many of the organizations mentioned in the RENAMU survey have 
some type of relationship with the local governments25, and the two most numerous receive 
resources from the central government through the local government. However, these 
organizations have been created for very specific tasks and it is not clear if they normally 






Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Mother Clubs 648,207 1819 356 106.65 0 35,385 
Glass of Milk 4’459,604 1819 2,452 25.92 0 151,091 
Communal 
Kitchens 
895,921 1819 493 12.87 0 37,186 
Wawa Wasi 54,340 1819 30  0 1,432 
Elderly Clubs 55,729 1819 31 2.6 0 15,347 
Young Clubs 51,880 1819 29 5.18 0 3,020 
Others 216,370 1819 119 12.64 0 40,000 
 
Table 9.  Beneficiaries of Social Organizations in the RENAMU Survey (2005) 
 
 
25 Most likely for this reason these organizations are included in the RENAMU survey. 
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In tables 8 and 9, I have presented a disaggregated view of the additional social 
organizations that exist at the district level, I discussed the two most important 
organizations so the reader can have a better understanding of these organizations. 
However, I will include these organizations in the empirical analysis of the previous section 
by combining them into two variables. The first variable is the total number of social 
organizations in the district, the second variable is the total number of beneficiaries in each 
district. Similar to section 3.2, I will re-estimate equations 3 and 4 with an added interaction 
term describing the product of the lag of the per-capita canon with one of the two new 
measures of social capital (total number of social organizations in the district and total 
number of beneficiaries on each district). This type of specification will allow testing for 
potentially different effects of peasant communities and other social organizations on 
conflict. Also, since the correlation among the new social organizations’ variables and the 
peasant communities’ indicators is very low (always less than 0.06) it is likely that the new 





 Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Lagged Log 
of Canon Per 
Capita -0.00145 0.00282 -0.00269 0.00226 -0.00035 0.00178 -0.00148 0.00096 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lagged Log 




Communities -0.00363** -0.00313**   
-
0.00200**
* -0.00175**   
 (0.002) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)   
Lagged Log 





Hectares   -0.4894*** -0.4709***   -0.2372*** -0.2302*** 
   (0.177) (0.169)   (0.090) (0.087) 
Lagged Log 




Organizations 0.00026  0.00020  0.00012  0.0009  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Lagged Log 






Organizations  0.0000  0.0000  0.000  0.0000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.00)  (0.000) 
Non-
Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.0949 -0.0871 0.13883* 0.13158* -0.05146 -0.0487 0.0679* 0.06359 
 (0.110) (0.118) (0.075) (0.074) (0.056) (0.062) (0.039) (0.039) 
         
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
Districts 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. All Columns 
include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural population poverty, 
access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 




Table 10 shows the results obtained from estimating equation 3 with the additional 
interaction terms for the new social organization indicators. In the first four 
columns, the dependent variable is the number of months that local conflicts were 
active in a district during a year (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶). In columns 5 to 8 the dependent variable 
is the number of months that local conflicts were active in a district during a year 
averaged with the number of months that local conflicts have disruptive events in 
a district during the same year (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶). All specifications include district, year-
fixed effects, and non-parametric trends of year fixed effects interacted with 
indicators of above-mean value of rural population poverty, access to water, 
sanitation, and education levels. The results in Table 10 confirms the negative 
interactive relationship between peasant communities’ indicators and the log of 
canon per-capita over the local conflict indicators: the interaction coefficients of 
the peasant communities’ indicators did not change importantly in their sign, 
statistical significance, nor in their size. On the other hand, the interaction terms 
of the new social organizations are very small in size and did not have statistical 
significance in the estimation of equation 3 (Local conflicts). As mentioned in 
section 3.1.3, these organizations have very specific concerns and now the 
estimations show that they are unrelated to local conflicts. 
When the mining conflicts indicators are the dependent variables, Table 11 
confirms the positive interactive relationship between the peasant communities’ 
indicators and the log of canon per capita over the mining conflicts indicators. In 
the re-estimations of equation 4 shown in Table 11, the interaction coefficients of 
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the peasant communities’ indicators did not change importantly in their sign, 
statistical significance, nor in their size. The interaction terms of the new social 
organization indicators with the log of the canon per-capita show positive effects 
and statistical significance only when the number of hectares was used as peasant 
communities’ indicators. The sign is positive which is consistent with proposition 
2 from chapter 2. These positive effects are also potentially large. Considering the 
estimations in column 3 of Table 11, in a district located in the 90th percentile of 
the number of social organizations variable (106 social organizations) a one 
standard deviation increase in the log of the canon per-capita will generate an 
increase in the mining conflict indicator (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) of 0.1197, equivalent to a 
30.96% of the mean conflict indicator (0.39). Overall, a joint analysis of Tables 
10 and 11 show that the contrasting effects of peasant communities’ indicators 
hold after the inclusion of the additional indicator of social organizations, other 












 Dependent Variable: Mining Conflict Indicator 1 Dependent Variable: Mining Conflict Indicator 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
                  
Lagged Log 
of Canon Per 
Capita -0.12558*** -0.12105*** -0.08876** -0.07951** -0.06677*** -0.06408*** -0.04504** -0.0397* 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.04) (0.039) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
Lagged Log 




Communities  0.03486*** 0.03539***   0.01925*** 0.01956***   
 (0.01000) (0.010)   (0.005) (0.006)   
Lagged Log 





’ Hectares   3.01397*** 3.02795***   1.5721*** 
1.5809**
* 
   (1.131) (1.131)   (0.605) (0.606) 
         
Lagged Log 




Organizations 0.00070  0.00132**  0.00036  0.00071**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.00)  (0.000)  
Lagged Log 






Organizations  0.00001  0.00002*  0.0000  0.0001* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Non-
Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.40094 0.32612 0.2878 0.2765 0.20123 0.15273 0.14819 0.1415 
 (0.245) (0.268) (0.178) (0.178) (0.131) (0.141) (0.100) (0.100) 
         
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 
R-squared 0.041 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.034 0.034 
Number of 
Districts 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. All Columns 
include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural population poverty, 
access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
 




3.3.2 Other Variables Related to Peasant Communities  
In this subsection, I address the possibility that other social characteristics that are also 
typical in peasant communities are the underlying cause of the observed contrasting 
effects of social capital on conflict.  If this were the case, the observed relationship 
between peasant communities’ social capital and conflict would be a spurious 
relationship. The focus of this section is not to provide theoretical reasons why other 
social characteristics that are also typical in peasant communities could potentially affect 
conflict but to test whether other characteristics of peasant communities are driving the 
observed results. 
People living in peasant communities are normally regarded as having lower education 
levels, speaking Quichua and Aymara as native languages, having higher levels of 
poverty, and having more rural population, among other characteristics. The table in  
Appendix 2 shows the correlation of the two peasant communities’ indicators with ten 
other variables.  Among these ten variables the highest correlation (0.48) was between the 
number of peasant communities and the percentage of the population that did not have 
Spanish as his first language in 2007. The correlation is always higher using the number 
rather than the land area of peasant communities, so I focus on this indicator. The high 
correlation of the number of peasant communities with the share of the population that 
did not learn to speak with Spanish is not a surprising result since peasant communities 
are mostly indigenous people. The second highest correlation of the number of peasant 
communities is the correlation with the percentage of the population that was extremely 
poor in 2009 (0.33). The third highest is the correlation with the percentage of the rural 
poverty in 2007 (0.3).  
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From the ten variables in the table in Appendix 2, I selected the six variables that had a 
higher correlation with the number of peasant communities. Then I proceed as follows: 
First, I estimate equations 3 and 4 but using the six variables instead of the peasant 
communities’ indicators and look for variables that have similar contrasting effects on the 
two types of conflicts (mining and local). I found that two variables showed similar 
contrasting effects with statistical significance.  Second, I re-estimate equations 3 and 4, 
but on each equation, I include both the peasant communities’ indicator and the variables 
that showed similar contrasting effects to differentiate between the peasant community 
effects and the other characteristics effects. Below are the results obtained on each of the 
two steps just mentioned. 
Effects of Variables correlated with Peasant Communities on Local and Mining 
NVR Campaigns  
In this subsection, I present the results obtained from replacing the peasant communities’ 
indicators in the estimations of equations 3 and 4 with other social characteristics common 
in peasant communities.  As mentioned above, I chose the six variables with the highest 
correlation from a group of ten variables. Tables 12 presents the results for local conflicts. 
The dependent variable in Table 12 is 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶 (the results are similar in sign and 
significance if the dependent variable is 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶, see the table in the Appendix  3) 
Two variables show statistically significant effects when interacted with the lagged canon 
per-capita:  The percentage of the population that did not have Spanish as its native 
language in 2007 (at 99% significance) and the percentage of the population in extreme 
poverty in 2007 (90% significance). Furthermore, the sign of these two variables is 
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negative, implying a negative interactive effect, just as the peasant communities’ effect 
on local conflicts. 
Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
              
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 0.00122 0.0274 0.0203 0.0187 -0.00532 0.00528 
 (0.0213) (0.0173) (0.0194) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0261) 
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Urban 
Population (%) -0.00735      
 (0.0339)      
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Non-Spanish 
Native Speakers 
(%)  -0.0770***     
  (0.0253)     
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Rural Poverty 
(%)   -0.0429    
   (0.0374)    
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Extreme 
Poverty (%)    -0.0878*   
    (0.0454)   
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Access to 
Public Sewage 
System (%)     -0.000597  
     (0.0457)  
Lagged Log of 




(%)      -0.0600 
      (0.141) 
Non-Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.834*** 0.588*** -0.00970 0.123 0.182 0.177 
 (0.257) (0.225) (0.175) (0.101) (0.116) (0.120) 
       
Observations 9,546 9,696 9,702 9,702 9,696 9,696 
R-squared 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
Districts 1,591 1,616 1,617 1,617 1,616 1,616 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. All 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural 
population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
 




Table 13 show the results when the dependent variable is 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁, (the results are similar 
in sign and significance if the dependent variable is 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁, see the table in the Appendix 
4) 
 In the estimations of Table 13, three variables show statistically significant effects: the 
percentage of the population that did not have Spanish as its first language in 2007 (at 
95% significance), the percentage of the population in extreme poverty in 2007 (90% 
significance), and the percentage of the population that did not have access to a public 
sewage system (90 % significance). Moreover, the sign of these three variables is positive, 

















Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita 0.0629 -0.0625 -0.0752 -0.0895 -0.0225 -0.0691 
 (0.0613) (0.0427) (0.0477) (0.0613) (0.0435) (0.0619) 
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Urban 
Population (%) -0.144      
 (0.0943)      




Speakers (%)  0.173**     
  (0.0798)     
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Rural 
Poverty (%)   0.155    
   (0.0974)    




Poverty (%)    0.398*   
    (0.206)   
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Access 
to Public 
Sewage System 
(%)     0.200*  
     (0.116)  





Level (%)      0.450 
      (0.356) 
Non-Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.241 0.504* 0.266 -0.595* -0.563 -0.555 
 (0.263) (0.282) (0.215) (0.355) (0.403) (0.402) 
       
Observations 9,546 9,696 9,702 9,702 9,696 9,696 
R-squared 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.031 
Number of 
Districts 1,591 1,616 1,617 1,617 1,616 1,616 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. All 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of 
rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
 




An overall look at Tables 12 and 13 shows that the share of the population that did not 
have Spanish as its native language in 2007 and the percentage of the population in 
extreme poverty in 2007 have the same contrasting effects on conflict than the peasant 
communities’ indicators. It is hard to argue that these two variables are indicators of social 
capital.  However, since these variables are importantly correlated with the peasant 
communities’ indicators, it is not clear which variable is actually generating the 
contrasting effects. To address this concern, I estimate equations 3 and 4 again, controlling 
for the two concerning variables. 
 
Controlling for the Share of Native Non-Spanish Speakers in the Population 
In Tables 14 and 15, I present the results of the estimations of equations 3 and 4 
respectively, but on each estimation I have included an interaction term of the product of 
the log of the per-capita canon and the percentage of non-Spanish speakers in a district. 
In Table 14, the first two columns present the results with 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶 as dependent variable. 













Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict 
Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict 
Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita 0.02906* 0.03148* 0.01529 0.01625* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Number of 
Peasant Communities -0.00091  -0.00061  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
i Lagged Log of Canon 
Per Capita X Non-
Spanish Native Speakers 
(%) -0.07672*** -0.07721*** -0.03986*** -0.04088*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Recognized 
Peasant Communities’ 
Hectares  -0.30641**  -0.14449* 
  (0.152)  (0.077) 
Non-Parametric Trends Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.06225 -0.06103 -0.04089 -0.04047 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.081) (0.082) 
     
Observations 9,604 9,604 9,604 9,604 
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 
Number of Districts 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. 
All Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of 
rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
 
Table 14. Local Conflicts, Peasant Communities and Percentage of Non-Spanish Speakers 
 
The results in Table 14 show that the negative interactive effect of the number of hectares 
of peasant communities and the log of per-capita canon on local conflicts holds after 
controlling for the percentage of the population that did not learn to speak with Spanish 
as their first language. The size of the effects is around 80% of the previous effect. When 
the number of peasant communities is used as indicator, the estimated interaction 






Dependent Variable.: Mining 
Conflict Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
Dependent Variable.: Mining 
Conflict Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita -0.101** -0.0933** -0.0546** -0.0493** 
 (0.0446) (0.0438) (0.0241) (0.0237) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Number of Peasant 
Communities 0.0366***  0.0201***  
 (0.0108)  (0.00583)  
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Non-Spanish 
Native Speakers (%) 0.0109 0.140* 0.00786 0.0799* 
 (0.0837) (0.0807) (0.0437) (0.0424) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares  2.825**  1.463** 
  (1.157)  (0.619) 
Non-Parametric Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.00319 0.519* 0.0119 0.274* 
 (0.231) (0.282) (0.122) (0.152) 
     
Observations 9,696 9,696 9,696 9,696 
R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.032 
Number of Districts 1,616 1,616 1,616 1,616 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed 
effects. All Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- 
the mean value of rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. 
 
Table 15. Mining Conflicts, Peasant Communities and Percentage of Non-Spanish Speakers 
 
Table 15 shows that the positive interactive effects of both indicators of peasant 
communities with the log of per-capita canon on mining conflicts hold after controlling 
for the percentage of the population that did not learn Spanish as their first language. 
Overall, Tables 14 and 15 provide evidence that the contrasting effects of peasant 
communities on local and mining conflicts hold after controlling for the percentage of the 




Controlling for the Share of the Population in Extreme poverty 
 
A similar pattern is observed if instead of controlling for the percentage of the population 
that did not learn Spanish as their first language, I control for the share of the population 
living in extreme poverty. 
The results in Table 16 show that the negative interactive effects of the two peasant 
communities’ indicators and the log of per-capita canon on local conflicts hold after 
controlling for the percentage of the population that lived in extreme poverty; the size of 
the effects is around 70% of the previous effect. Again, in the first two columns of Tables 















     
 
Dependent Variable.: Local 
Conflict Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
Dependent Variable.: Local 
Conflict Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Lagged Log of Canon 
Per Capita 0.02052 0.02127 0.01045 0.01061 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
Lagged Log of Canon 
Per Capita X Number 
of Peasant 
Communities -0.00203  -0.00121*  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
Lagged Log of Canon 
Per Capita X Extreme 
Poverty (%) -0.07517 -0.07874* -0.03729 -0.04099* 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.025) (0.024) 
Lagged Log of Canon 
Per Capita X 
Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ 
Hectares  -0.36548**  -0.17612** 
  (0.158)  (0.080) 
Non-Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.14811 0.09313 0.07199 0.04295 
 (0.109) (0.096) (0.058) (0.052) 
     
Observations 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 
Number of Districts 1,615 1,615 1,615 1,615 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district 
and year fixed effects. All Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects 
interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural population poverty, access to water, 
sanitation, and education levels. 
 
Table 16. Local Conflicts, Peasant Communities and Percentage of The Population in Extreme 
Poverty. 
 
Table 17 shows that the positive interactive effects of both indicators of peasant 
communities with the log of per-capita canon over mining conflicts hold after controlling 
for the percentage of the population that lived in extreme poverty. Again, the size of the 
interactive effects of the peasant communities’ indicators are of around 70% of the 




     
 
Dependent Variable.: 
Mining Conflict Indicator 1 
(𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
Dependent Variable.: 
Mining Conflict Indicator 2 
(𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita -0.119** -0.107* -0.0643** -0.0571* 
 (0.0603) (0.0610) (0.0318) (0.0322) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Number of Peasant 
Communities 0.0357***  0.0196***  
 (0.0107)  (0.00579)  
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Extreme Poverty 
(%) 0.0988 0.299 0.0567 0.170 
 (0.217) (0.210) (0.114) (0.111) 
Lagged Log of Canon Per 
Capita X Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares  2.692**  1.388** 
  (1.143)  (0.608) 
Non-Parametric Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.0247 -0.581 -0.0278 -0.268 
 (0.271) (0.353) (0.142) (0.179) 
     
Observations 9,702 9,702 9,702 9,702 
R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.037 0.032 
Number of Districts 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district 
and year fixed effects. All Columns include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects 
interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural population poverty, access to water, 
sanitation, and education levels. 
 
Table 17. Mining Conflicts, Peasant Communities and Percentage of The Population in Extreme 
Poverty 
 
Overall, Tables 16 and 17 show that contrasting effects of peasant communities’ social 
capital over local and mining conflicts hold also after controlling for the extreme poverty 
indicators. 
In the CCESC model, social capital was of paramount importance to coordinate a new 
equilibrium after an exogenous social change. The model did not specify which type of 
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social capital was necessary to quickly reach a new equilibrium. In sections 3.2 and 3.3, 
I have been using measures of social capital as in Putnam’s (1993) work, that is, indicators 
of the existence of social organizations. Although, I have been using at least two broad 
types of social organizations, the results are more robust with the peasant communities’ 
indicators. Thus, even if the reader is not persuaded by the number of peasant 
communities and the hectares of these peasant communities as indicators of social capital, 
it is clear that there is at least a “peasant communities contrasting effect” on local and 
mining conflicts. However, given the information provided about how peasant 
communities organize and how they share networks of reciprocity and rules of civic 
engagement, it is very likely that the observed contrasting effects are due to a capacity to 




3.4 Where Does the Peruvian Social Capital Come From? The Colonial Origins of the 
Peruvian Social Capital 
 
The CCESC model’s main contribution is to explain the contrasting coordination effects 
of social capital on conflict and the importance of social capital in obtaining concessions. 
Social capital is taken for granted in this model, but its presence is not explained. In the 
Peruvian context, unlike other social organizations, peasant communities in a district have 
explained most of the variation in local and mining conflicts. However, the existence of 
peasant communities was assumed in previous sections. In this subsection, I provide some 
evidence about the formation of this type of social organizations. More precisely, I argue 
that legally recognized peasant communities in the first half of the 20th century can be 
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explained by colonial extractive institutions. In these historical processes, resistance 
against external powers26 through revolts and rebellions was an important channel of 
persistence for social capital. 
 These persistent effects of revolts and rebellions on social capital operated as follows. 
First, the indigenous population experienced structural violence from many extractive 
institutions (the mining mita, the reductions, the Corregidor, the Encomendero, the 
Hacendados, etc.27). The violence created by these extractive institutions promoted social 
capital cooperation either for social insurance28 or for organizing rebellions that allow 
peasant communities to resist these institutions. The cooperation capacities required to 
organize revolts and rebellions are high. Hence, under colonial rule, revolts and rebellions 
are indicators of a higher capacity to coordinate and cooperate to resist in those areas. In 
other word, revolts and rebellions are indicators of high levels social capital. 
 Second, this high capacity to cooperate was not lost after the end of the revolts and 
rebellions. Instead, it was constantly used in intracommunity activities, in new actions 
against persistent extractive institutions in the colony, or in resisting the expansion of the 
Haciendas29 during the republic. This constant use of their cooperation capacities 
generated persistent high levels of social capital30, which facilitated cooperation to obtain 
 
26 These external powers sought to extract as much surplus as possible from the peasant communities’ labor 
force during colonial times and during the first century of the republic. Acemoglu and Robison (2001, 2012) 
have studied institutional settings of this type, which they named “extractive institutions”. 
27 These social agents incarnated the extractive institutions in place within the Peruvian viceroyalty and 
republic. In Appendix 5, I have included a brief history of the peasant communities during the colony and 
the republic. This history includes a description of the role of each social agent (Corregidor, the 
Encomendero, the administrators of the mines, and the Hacendados).  
28 For instance, if one family had their male members sent to work in the mining mita, other families might 
organize to supply food and help or other basic needs to the family that has lost a member. 
29 Haciendas are rural states property of private owners. During colonial times and under the republic,  
these rural states sought to expand their lands.  




legal recognition of their communal organizations during the first half of the 20th century. 
Figure 4 summarizes this argument. It is worth mentioning the importance of the arrow 
that goes back from social capital to revolts and then again to social capital since it 
indicates how social capital is preserved and persists in time. 
 
 
Figure 4. Extractive Colonial Institutions and Peasant Communities in the 20th Century. 
 
The rest of this subsection has two parts. In the first part, I focus on the relationship 
between revolts and rebellions in the 18th century and peasant communities in the first 
half of the 20th century.  I provide some suggestive empirical evidence that in locations in 
which revolts in the 18th century occurred, it was more likely that the indigenous 
organizations obtained legal recognition in the first half of the 20th century. In the second 
part, I focus on one of the cruelest extractive institutions of the colony, the mining mita. 
I use the data and the empirical strategy suggested for the first time in Dell (2010) to show 
that this harmful extractive institution that started in the 16th century had persistent effects 
on the formation of social capital and on the first peasant communities that obtained legal 
recognition in the 20th century. Thus, one channel of persistence is the revolts and 




















3.4.1 Colonial Revolts and Peasant Communities in the 20th Century  
Peasant communities started to obtain legal recognition after the enactment of the first 
constitution that recognized them as legitimate organizations in 1920. But obtaining legal 
recognition was not an easy process. It required to get information of this opportunity 
which was difficult in rural areas;  required to have funds to travel to Lima (the capital 
city); to being able to write and present documentation in Spanish (most indigenous 
people only spoke Quechua or Aymara in 1920); also, these processes entailed having 
legal representatives (lawyers). All these requirements implied that obtaining legal 
recognition in this period required high levels of organization or high social capital. 
 Interestingly, the first peasant community that obtained legal recognition did it in 1921, 
one year after the enactment of the 1920 constitution. This community was the 
“Machaccoyo” peasant community, which is located in the Canas province in the Cuzco 
region. This province is the birthplace of Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui known as Tupac 
Amaru II, the leader of the Greatest Rebellion of the 18th century. In other words, the first 
peasant community to obtain legal recognition is located at the center of the provinces 
that were part of the Greatest Rebellion of the 18th century. Moreover, until 1926, 16 more 
peasant communities from the Canas province managed to obtain legal recognition. The 
first province to obtain legal recognitions of its peasant communities, the Canas province, 
supports my claim that that participation in insurrections, revolts, and rebellions in the 
18th century had persistent effects in peasant communities’ capacity to organize and 
cooperate to obtain legal recognition in the 20th century. It is well known that the Great 
Rebellion required high levels of cooperation among provinces, since they have to 
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coordinate actions, and provide supply lines that involved obtaining resources from many 
provinces. This high capacity of organization and cooperation persisted until the 20th 
century and was used to obtain legal recognition as soon as it was legally possible in the 
1920s. 
But what about other revolts in the 18th century? The first registered revolt in the 18th 
century  occurred in 1719 in the Cayna district located in what is known today as the 
Huánuco province. The Curaca and the indigenous population rebelled against the 
representative of the Church. The indigenous population in this district rebelled also in 
1810 and 1812 against viceroy Abascal. In the 20th century, peasant communities of this 
district were also among the first in getting legal recognition, they obtained their legal 




Figure 5. Revolts and Rebellions in Colonial Perú, 18th Century 
 
The revolt in Cayna, the Great Tupac Amaru Rebellion, and other 138 revolts that 
occurred in the 18th century have been collected and studied by Scarlet O’phelan in his 
famous book “A Century of Colonial Revolts” (1985). Among the 140 revolts and 
rebellions listed in O’phelan’s book, 118 occurred within the current Peruvian boundaries. 
Each one of these revolts and rebellions have been located in current Peruvian districts in 
 
 88 
Figure 4, which also shows the geographical distribution and the number of these revolts 
and rebellions on each contemporary district. The majority of these conflictive events 
occurred in the Andean part of the country.   
I used these revolts to provide more systematic evidence that participation in 
insurrections, revolts, and rebellions in the 18th century had persistent effects in the 
peasant communities’ capacity to organize and cooperate to obtain legal recognition 
during the first half of the 20th century. I use peasant communities registered until 1948.  
I do this for two reasons. First, around 1948 there were many other social processes that 
potentially alter the relations between urban and rural areas after 1948. Among these 
processes, the strong migration to the urban areas and the emergence of proletarian parties 
are important. Second, in 1948 a dictatorship that lasted 8 years started. During this period 
of absence of liberties and repression, the number of peasant communities that managed 
to obtain legal recognition decreased dramatically, this situation allows for an exogenous 
cut date in the registration of peasant communities. 
I use regression analysis to test the relationship between 18th century revolt’s and 20th 
century’s legally recognized peasant communities. In the regression analysis the unit of 
observation is the current district. Thus, the independent variable is the number of revolts 
and rebellions that occurred in that district in the 18th century. I will use three dependent 
variables: i) the number of peasant communities legally recognized on each district until 
1948, ii) The number of hectares legally recognized by peasant communities on each 
district until 1948, and iii) the fractionalization index of the lands that belong to peasant 
communities on each district until 1948. 
 
 89 
Table 8 shows the results of the regressions of the independent variable over the three 
dependent variables. Column 1 shows the results of the regression of the number of revolts 
over the number of legally recognized peasant communities. Column 2 shows the results 
when the dependent variable is the number of hectares legally recognized to peasant 
communities. Finally, column 3 shows the result when the dependent variable is the 
fractionalization index of the lands that belong to peasant communities on each district. 
In all the three regressions the coefficients were positive and statistically significant.  
According to these estimations, more revolts increased the number of peasant 
communities that managed to obtain legal recognition in the 20th century, revolts also 
increased the land recognized to peasant communities, and also implied that this land were 
more fragmented. Overall, the results provide suggestive evidence that participation in 
insurrections, revolts, and rebellions in the 18th century did have persistent effects in 
peasant communities’ capacity to organize and cooperate to obtain legal recognition in 













 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 











Index of the 
Recognized lands, 
1948 
       
Nr. Revolts or 
Rebellions in the 18th 
century 0.0798*** 745.8*** 0.00292*** 
 (0.0173) (160.6) (0.000759) 
Constant 0.518*** 4,391*** 0.0235*** 
 (0.0288) (152.8) (0.00165) 
    
Observations 1,866 1,866 1,866 
R-squared 0.025 0.014 0.012 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 18. The Persistent Effects of Revolts in 18th Century on Peasant Communities in the 20th 
Century 
 
I have also analyzed the effects of revolts in the 18th century in measures of how prone 
the districts are to have mining and local NVR campaigns. To do this, I added all the 
mining and local NVR indicators during the whole period of analysis of chapter 3 (2006-
2011). These indicators can be interpreted as long-term indicators of the predisposition of 
each district to have mining and local NVR campaigns. Table 9 shows the results. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is the total number of mining NVR campaigns that a 
district had during 2006 to 2011.  In column 2, the dependent variable is the sum of the 
values of the variable 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁 used in chapter 3 for the period 2006-2011. In column 3, 
the dependent variable is the sum of the values of the variable 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁, used in chapter 3, 
for the period 2006-2011. Columns 4 to 6 have variables similar to the first three columns 
but for local NVR campaigns instead. 
It is striking how revolts and rebellions in the 18th century seem to be positively and 
statistically related to long term mining NVR campaigns indicators but not to long term 
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local NVR campaigns indicators. One explanation for this pattern is that revolts in the 
18th century can be seen as resistance campaigns against external actors and for this reason 
they are related to current resistance campaigns against external actors and not to 
resistance campaigns against internal actors. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Nr. Mining 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁 Nr. Local 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶 
              
Nr. Revolts or 
Rebellions in 
the 18th century 0.0451*** 0.460*** 0.260*** -0.00223 0.0232 0.0141 
 (0.0159) (0.137) (0.0777) (0.00359) (0.0276) (0.0155) 
Constant 0.146*** 1.867*** 1.013*** 0.111*** 0.609*** 0.332*** 
 (0.0217) (0.209) (0.114) (0.0128) (0.0865) (0.0469) 
       
Observations 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,866 
R-squared 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 19. Revolts in the 18th Century and Mining and Local NVR campaigns, 2006-2011 
 
 3.4.2. Mining Mita and Peasant Communities  
In this subsection, I focus on the mining mita. Created in 1572 by Viceroy Toledo, the 
mining mita forced the indigenous population to provide one seventh of their male 
population on each reduction31 located in the area designated to provide a workforce for 
the mines of Potosí (silver) and Huancavelica (Mercury). Those that served in the mining 
mita experienced a very high likelihood of dying during the time they served. Thus, the 
mining mita was one of the deadliest extractive institutions in the colony. I argue that 
locations in which the mining mita was required experienced more rebellions and revolts 
 
31 Reductions were settlements modeled as towns and villages in Spain in which the indigenous 
population was relocated forcibly. 
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compared to places in which the mita was not required. In turn, these rebellions and 
revolts will generate more capacity to resists, coordinate, and cooperate which will 
generate more social capital. Through these revolts, social capital will persist and in the 
first half of the 20th century mining mita locations had  peasant communities with higher 
social capital which helped them to obtain legal recognition of their organization and their 
lands. Melissa Dells’ pioneering work suggested an empirical strategy to clearly identify 
the effect of the mining mita. The mining mita required that an important part of the 
colonial territory provide a labor force for the mines. However, Dell noted that only part 
of the mining mita boundary allowed for an accurate comparison of districts with and 
without mita. That part is labeled in Figure 6 as “Study Boundary.” Other parts of the mita 






Figure 6. Altitude Map, Mita and Study Boundary. Source: Melissa Dell’s (2010) 
 
To identify a mita effect, Dell compared districts with and without mita but within 100 
Km. of the study boundary by using a Regression Discontinuity Design estimation 
(RDD), which allows to interpret the “mita treatment” as if it were randomly assigned.  In 
her study, Dell provided evidence of a long-run negative effect of the mining mita on 
indicators of child development and consumption levels in 2001.  In this dissertation, I 
provide evidence of a “new mita effect”: a long-run effect of the mita on peasant 
communities in the first half of the 20th century.  I argue that locations that experienced 
the mining mita had peasant communities with higher social capital in the 20th century. 
These higher levels of social capital imply that these peasant communities where among 
the first to obtain legal recognition of their land until 1948. To support this claim, I use 















Table 20. Mita and Peasant Communities (RDD Estimates) 
 
The sample used in Table 20 is smaller than the sample in section 3.4.1. since the RDD 
method only focuses on districts near the “study boundary”, and there are many districts 
with missing values.  The “mita treatment” shows a positive and significant effect on the 
hectares that peasant communities managed to obtain legal recognition until 1948. In two 
of the three specifications used for the latent variable (See columns 2 and 3). Furthermore, 
the mita also had an effect on the number of revolts and rebellions registered during the 
18th century.  Table 21 shows the results of the RDD estimation in which the mining mita 
is still the treatment variable, but the dependent variable is the number of revolts and 
rebellions that occurred in the 18th century. The results show that mita districts observed 
Dependent Variable: Peasant Communities’ Land Legally Recognized until 
1948 







in Distance to 
Potosí 
Cubic Polynomial in 
Distance to Mita 
Boundary 
        
Mita 4,808.4156 10,511.7114* 10,812.8677** 
 (5,931.516) (6,197.727) (4,410.727) 
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Boundary F.E.s Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 44 44 44 
R-squared 0.552 0.381 0.346 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Three 
different latent variables have been used in a cubic polynomial to model the 
discontinuity of the RDD estimation, each is represented in a separated 
column in the table. 
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more rebellions and revolts compared to non-mita districts in all the three specifications 
of the latent variable (See columns 1 to 3) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Revolts and Rebellions 1719-1783 











in Distance to Mita 
Boundary 
        
Mita 1.9764*** 1.1894*** 1.5445*** 
 (0.667) (0.431) (0.397) 
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Boundary F.E.s Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.299 0.219 0.295 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Three different latent variables have been used in a cubic polynomial to 
model the discontinuity of the RDD estimation, each is represented in a 
separated column in the table. 
 
Table 21. Mita and Revolts in the 18th Century (RDD Estimates) 
 
 
Tables 20 and 21 jointly support the claim that extractive colonial institutions (i.e. the 
mining  mita) had persistent effects on the peasant communities’s social capital and that 
revolts and rebellions served as the mechanisms of persistence of these effects. Moreover, 
the results in Table 22 show that the mining mita also has persistent effects on conflicts 
in current times. Similar to the results obtained in Table 19, the mining mita explains only 
current indicators of mining conflicts but not current indicators of local conflicts. Table 
22, columns 1 to 3, show the results of the RDD estimation of the effects of the mita on 
current mining conflicts. In two of the three specifications of the latent variable, the 
estimated effect was positive and statistically significant, implying a long-term effect of 
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the mita on mining conflicts. In contrast, the effects of the mining mita on local conflicts 
were not statistically significant (columns4-6). 
All these results suggest that peasant communities have a persistent capacity to organize 
and resist against external actors, but this capacity is used differently when contentious 













Dep. Var: Aggregated Mining Conflict 
Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁) in 2006-2011 
Dep. Var: Aggregated Local Conflict 
Indicator 1 (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶) in 2006-2011 
































              
Mita 3.4040 4.3077* 4.2304** 0.0532 -0.1108 -0.6300 
 (2.825) (2.272) (1.968) (0.530) (0.519) (0.566) 
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Boundary 
F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.145 0.078 0.106 0.165 0.118 0.092 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Three different latent 
variables have been used in a cubic polynomial to model the discontinuity of the RDD estimation, 
each is represented in a separated column in the table. 
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Chapter 4: The Effects of Nonviolent Campaigns on Public 
Policy: Evidence from Perú  
Are nonviolent campaigns effective in obtaining concessions? What is the role of social 
capital in obtaining concessions? Based on the CCESC model, I answer these questions 
empirically using data from Peru. In chapter 3, I found evidence that supported the claim 
that depending on whether the receiver of claims is external or internal, social capital has 
opposite effects on contention (Propositions 1 and 2 of the CCESC model) but another 
central prediction of the CCESC model is that social capital increases the likelihood that 
NVR campaigns will obtain concessions (Proposition 3 of the CCESC model).  Providing 
evidence that nonviolent campaigns do obtain concessions is crucial to explain the 
rationality of the claimants and the observed increase in the number of NVR campaigns 
in the period 2006-2011. As in chapter 3, I focus on the two main types of nonviolent 
campaigns, mining and local conflicts.  
Chapter 4 is structured as follows: In section 4.1, I present the relevant institutional 
characteristics of the Peruvian budgetary process. Knowledge of these characteristics is 
necessary to track the relevant changes in the budget that occur as consequence of 
nonviolent campaigns. In section 4.2, I analyze the effects of the local conflicts. After 
explaining the identification strategy, I present the results obtained in the regression 
analysis. These results show that local conflicts caused the local political authorities to 
reallocate budget towards the provision of public goods. The greater are the levels of 
social capital, the higher the levels of reallocation of the budget towards public goods 
provision. In section 4.3, I turn to the effects of the mining conflicts. In this subsection, I 
show that mining conflicts will increase discretional transfers for public goods provision 
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to the local government from the central government because the central government 
wants to persuade local populations to allow the mining activities without disruptions. 
Overall, the results of section 4.2 and 4.3 support proposition 3’s claim that conflicts 
obtain concessions from the receiver of the claims 
 
4.1 Peruvian Institutional Background 
The main available source to track changes in the provision of publics goods as 
consequence of NVR campaigns is the government’s national accounts.  In this 
subsection, I provide a summary of the most relevant characteristics of the Peruvian 
budgetary process and a of the national account’s system used by the Peruvian 
government which is called The Integrated System for Administration and Finance 
(SIAF). 
 
The Budget Process 
The government’s budget in Peru is approved, as in many democracies, by the congress 
in the previous year, normally in the period that goes from October to December. This 
budget includes revenues and expenditures for the three levels of governments: i) the 
national or central government, ii) the regional governments, and iii) the local 
governments. The initial budget approved for the three levels of government is referred 
within the SIAF as the Presupuesto Institucional de Apertura (PIA). Once the fiscal year 
has started, the execution of the budget and any modifications are registered in the 
modified budget or Presupuesto Institucional Modificado (PIM).  
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Expenditures can be classified in two broad types, regular expenditures (Gasto Corrientes 
) and investment expenditures (Gasto de Inversión). Regular expenditures refer to 
expenditures on salaries, on consumption goods, and other nondurable goods. Investment 
expenditures refer to expenditures made to build physical infrastructure, equipment, and 
other durable goods. Regular and investment expenditures of the local governments can 
be financed from five general sources of financing. However, local governments normally 
finance their expenditures with two types of general sources: determined resources and 
ordinary resources.  
 
The Determined Resources are by definition resources of the local governments which 
can be used only by them, if these resources are not used in a given year, they will still be 
available next year. There are three types of determined resources:  
• The Canon revenues are composed of 50% of the mining firm’s corporate taxes. 
The amount each district receives is based on an exogenous pre-established 
formula. The Canon revenues can only be used on investment expenditures. 
• The FONCOMUN, which comes from the 2% of the value-added tax of all the 
sales made in a given province. The amount each district receives is based on a 
distribution formula that depends on the population and levels of poverty. The 
FONCOMUN can be used for both regular expenditures and investment 
expenditures. The local government decides the composition of expenditures. 
• Municipal Taxes are all taxes collected by the local government at the local level. 





The Ordinary resources are by definition resources of the central government which can 
be used by the central government or can also be transferred to local and regional 
governments.  
Table 23 summarizes the structure of expenditure financing presented so far and the forms 
in which each type is allowed to be used. 
In the Peruvian National accounts (SIAF), each expenditure includes information about 
its PIA amount, its PIM amount, the type of expenditure (regular or investment), and the 
source of financing (Canon, FONCOMUN, Municipal Taxes, Ordinary Resources, etc.). 
I focus on investment expenditures to check if NVR campaigns have an effect on public 
goods provision. 
 Expenditures on investment are normally done to provide some type of infrastructure that 












General Source of 
Expenditure Financing 






Canon Can be used only for investments expenditures.  
Local gov. decides among different types of 
investments. 
FONCOMUN Can be used in both, regular and investment 
expenditures, Local gov. decides between these two 
types. 
Municipal Taxes Can be used in both, regular and investment 




No Specific Source Can be used in both, regular and investment 
expenditures, Central Gov. decides the type before 
transferring these resources to Local Gov. 
Donations 
and Transfers 
No Specific Source Can be used in both, regular and investment 




No Specific Source Can be used in both, regular and investment 
expenditures, Local Gov. decides between these two 
types. 
Resources by Credit 
Operations 
No Specific Source Can be used only for investments expenditures. Central 
Gov. authorizes or generates the Debt. 
 







Investment Financing Structure 
Although investment expenditures can be financed with any of the five general sources 
described in the first column of Table 23, in the period of this study investment of the 
local governments have been financed mainly by Canon, Ordinary resources and 
FONCOMUN. Table 24 shows the average investment financing structure of local 
governments.  
 
Table 24. Local Governments Investment Financing Structure (2007-2012) 
 
The most important source of investment expenditures in local governments is the canon 
revenues. On average, the canon revenues financed 52% of all the investments of the local 
governments in the period 2007-2012. This pattern is not surprising since in this period 
the mineral commodities experienced historical high prices and canon revenues can only 
be used on investment expenditures. The second most important source of investment 
expenditures of the local governments is the ordinary resources, these resources financed 
 
 Observations Average Standard Dev. Min. Max. 
% Total Investment financed with 
Canon Revenues 
11007 52.00 30.00 0 100 
% Total Investment financed with 
Ordinary Resources 
7350 25.11 21.1 0 98.4 
% Total Investment financed with 
FONCOMUN Revenues 
10356 21.90 20.10 0 100 
% Total Investment financed with 
Donations and others. 
5318 8.86 13.90 0 92.5 
% Total Investment financed with 
Municipal Taxes 




on average 25.11% of all the investments of local governments. These resources are 
provided by the central government discretionally, they do not have a pre-established 
source and distributional formula as the canon and FONCOMUN. The FONCOMUN is 
the third most important source of investment expenditures in local governments, on 
average around 22% of the investments were financed with FONCOMUN resources. 
These resources are more flexible in their use, they can be used in both regular 
expenditures or investment expenditures according to the decision of the local 
government.  
 
To detect possible important changes in the provision of public goods, I focus on detecting 
changes in two of the three main sources of investment expenditures described in the 
previous paragraph. The two sources of investments are ordinary resources and 
FONCOMUN, the canon resources do not allow to track important changes on 
investments. Bellow, I explain in detail how changes in detail how I will identify changes 
on investments for each source of investment. 
 
As mentioned before, each expenditure in the SIAF includes information about its initial 
budget amount (PIA), its modified budget amount (PIM), the type of expenditure (regular 
or investment), and the source of financing (Canon, FONCOMUN, Municipal Taxes, 
Ordinary Resources, etc.). Given this information, changes on investment decisions that 
occurred during the fiscal year can be detected by paying attention to the differences in 
the PIA and the PIM amounts for each investment expenditure observed in the SIAF. 
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These differences can be calculated for each type of source of financing (Canon, 
FONCOMUN, Ordinary Resources, Municipal Taxes, etc.).  
 
Changes on Investment financed with Canon 
Canon revenues are determined mainly by the profits made by mining firms in the 
previous year. Thus, social conflicts will not affect the amount of canon revenues to be 
received in the current year. Furthermore, since canon revenues can only be used on 
investment expenditures, it will not be possible to track any significant changes due to 
substitution of regular expenditures for investment expenditures. The expenditures 
included in the initial budget (PIA) and in the modified budget (PIM) financed with the 
Canon (only investment expenditures) will normally differ by small amounts, mainly due 
to differences in the projected profits calculated for the initial budget (PIA) and the actual 
profits which will determine the final canon revenues in the modified budget (PIM). 
Central and local governments cannot affect the total amount of canon revenues nor the 
percentage of these transfers used on investment expenditures. For these reasons changes 
in the PIA and PIM amounts on investments financed with Canon are likely to be small 
and unrelated to NVR campaigns. 
Changes on Investment financed with FONCOMUN. 
The amount of money available as local governments’ FONCOMUN resources cannot be 
affected by local conflicts since FONCOMUN is predetermined to be the 2% of the value-
added tax of all the sales made in a given province. However, local governments can 
freely decide how to divide the FONCOMUN revenues between regular expenditures and 
investment expenditures. This freedom gives local governments the option to switch from 
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regular expenditures to investment expenditures if an NVR campaign requesting more 
public goods arises. Changes in investments financed with FONCOMUN, therefore, offer 
an accurate way to track the effectiveness of NVR campaigns in the redistribution of 
resources towards public goods. 
A change of this type can be detected in the national accounts (SIAF) by looking for 
investment expenditures financed with FONCOMUN that have a PIA amount of zero but 
a large PIM amount. In other words, if the public policy changes to prioritize public goods 
provision with the FONCOMUN resources, this change can be detected in the national 
accounts by looking at differences in the PIA and PIM amounts.  
For instance, consider an investment expenditure registered in the SIAF for a new “School 
Lab.” this expenditure has a PIA amount of PEN S/.0 but it has a PIM amount of PEN 
S/.1,000,000, its source of financing is the FONCOMUN revenues. This information 
means that at the beginning of the year the school lab was not planned (PIA=0) but during 
the year, for some reason, the local government decided to build this lab and financed it 
with resources coming from the FONCOMUN (PIM=1,000,000). In section 4.2, I will 
use the log of this difference as the dependent variable in the estimation of the effects of 
local conflicts and social capital in the changes of the public goods provided by the local 
government with FONCOMUN resources. 
Changes on Investment financed with Ordinary Resources 
The central government normally acts as a promoter of investments in the mining sector, 
therefore, within a mining NVR campaign it will act mostly in favor of the mining firm 
(Revesz and Diez, 2006; De Echave, 2009). This type of behavior implies that, in order 
to persuade local populations (the claimants) to allow mining activities without any type 
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of disruptive actions, the central government will offer public goods to the claimants. 
These concessions from the central government can be detected in the national accounts 
as ordinary resources made available to local governments for the provision of public 
goods only in the modified budget (PIM), these resources will show value zero in the 
initial budget (PIA).  
For instance, consider an investment expenditure registered in the SIAF for a new “Rural 
Electrification Project,” this expenditure has a PIA amount of PEN S/.0 but it has a PIM 
amount of PEN S/.3,000,000. Its source of financing is the ordinary resources. This 
information means that at the beginning of the year the electrification projects was not 
planned (PIA=0) but during the year, for some reason, the central government transferred 
ordinary resources to the local government to build the electrification project 
(PIM=3,000,000). This type of change in the amount of ordinary resources made available 
to the local government can be detected in the national accounts by calculating the 
difference between the reported PIM and PIA of the investment expenditures financed 
with ordinary resources. In section 4.3, I will use the log of this difference as the 
dependent variable in the estimation of the effects of mining conflicts and social capital 
in the changes of the public goods provided by the local government with ordinary 
resources. 
 4.2 The Effects of Local NVR Campaigns and Social Capital on Local Government’s 
Public Goods Provision  
In this subsection, I empirically test proposition 3 of the CCESC model applied to local 
NVR campaigns. Proposition 3 establishes a positive interactive relationship between the 
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local conflict indicator and social capital, together these variables increase the budget for 
public good provision using FONCOMUN resources. 
In terms of the variables used, proposition 3 asserts that there exists a positive interactive 
effect of the local conflicts (𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶 or 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) and social capital on the log of the 
difference between the reported PIM and PIA of investment expenditures financed with 
FONCOMUN. The positive interactive effect of proposition 3 can be tested by estimating 
the following equation: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑛𝑐tuv − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑛𝑐tuw)Z^
= 𝛽h + 𝛽=𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ + 𝛽9𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ ∙ 𝑆𝐶Z + 𝛽:𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ + 𝛽x𝑂. 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶Z^
+	𝛽{𝐹𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑈𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ + 𝛿𝑋Z^ + 𝛼Z + 𝜃Z^ + 𝛾^ + 𝑣Z^. . . (5) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑛𝑐tuv − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝐹𝑜𝑛𝑐tuw)Z^ is the log of the difference between the final and 
initial budget used for investment expenditures financed with FONCOMUN resources.  
𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ is one of the two local conflict indicators discussed in section 3.1.1.,  𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ is 
the log of the canon per-capita in the current year, 𝑆𝐶Z is one of the two social capital 
indicators discussed in section 3.1.3, 𝐹𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑈𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ is log of the FONCOMUN per-
capita in the current year, 𝑂. 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶Z^ is the log of the ordinary resources per-capita in 
the current year,   𝑋Z^ is a set of controls, 𝛼Z and 𝛾^	are district and year fixed effects. If 
Proposition 3 is supported by the data, the estimated value of the parameter 𝛽9 should be 
positive and statistically significant.   
 
In addition to the emergence of local NVR campaigns and the levels of social capital, the 
existence of other sources to finance investments might affect local government’s 
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decision to reallocate resources from regular expenditures to investment expenditures 
financed with FONCOMUN. 
To account for these other sources, I have included both the log of the canon per-capita 
and the log of the ordinary resources per-capita in the estimation of equation 5. The total 
amount initially available of FONCOMUN resources is clearly relevant to determine the 
changes on investment financed with FONCOMUN, higher levels of FONCOMUN make 
it easier to reallocate resources from regular expenditures to investment expenditures. 
From the estimations in chapter 3, we know that canon (𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^) and local conflicts 
(𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^) are correlated. This might cause a multicollinearity problem which can increase 
the variance of the estimators, making it harder to obtain statistically significant results. 
However, in spite of this potential multicollinearity problem, if the estimations have 
statistically significant coefficients, we can be confident that the estimated effects are 
actually significant.  
Another concern in the estimation of equation 5 is the possibility of the existence of a 
simultaneity bias between the dependent variable and the NVR campaign measure. This 
would happen if the reallocation of FONCOMUN resources reduces the likelihood of the 
emergence of local NVR campaigns because people are satisfied with the reallocation and 
finds unnecessary to engage in NVR campaigns. These simultaneous effects will generate 
a negative bias over the positive coefficient of 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^. However, if despite of the 
simultaneity bias problem, a positive and significant effects is found, then this estimated 
effect will be a lower bound for the true effect.  
I have also included district fixed effects to deal with unobserved heterogeneity constant 
in time as well as year fixed effects to account for shocks that affected similarly to all 
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districts in the same year. Finally, I also included non-parametric trends such as year fixed 
effects interacted with indicators of above the mean value for the set of socioeconomic 
characteristics described in section 3.1.4.  
In Table 25, I present the results of the estimation of equation (5) for the two indicators 
of NVR local campaigns and also for the two indicators of social capital used in Chapter 
3. The first two columns show the results using the NVR campaign indicators 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ 
presented in Chapter 3 as independent variable. Columns 3 and 4 show the results using 
𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ as main independent variables. Interactive positive and significant effects (at 
10%) are found only when the number of peasant communities, 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛Z, is used as 
social capital indicator (Columns 1 and 3), the estimations in which the social capital was 
measured with the number of  legally recognized hectares that peasant communities have 
on each district did not result in statistically significant coefficients. 
In the first column, the local NVR campaign indicator is 𝐶1𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ and the social capital 
indicator is 𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛Z. In spite of the potential multicollinearity and simultaneity bias 
problems, the estimated value for 𝛽9 is positive as expected (0.0251) and statistically 
significant at the 10%. This effect is of moderate size. Considering the average value of 
the number of communities among the district that have at least one community 
(𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛Z =4.587), an increment of one standard deviation of the local NVR campaign 
indicator generates a change of 4.42% in the dependent variable, namely, there is a 4.42% 
more reallocation from regular to investment expenditures financed with FONCOMUN.  
Considering the second indicator of local NVR campaigns (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^), the effects are 
similar: a one standard deviation increase of 𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶Z^ generates reallocation from regular 





Dependent Variable: Log of the difference between PIM and PIA of Investment Expenditures financed with 
FONCOMUN (2007-2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
          
Local Conflict Indicator 1 -0.0704 -0.0225   
 (0.0651) (0.0679)   
Log of Total FONCOMUN 
Resources 3.634*** 3.639*** 3.633*** 3.639*** 
 (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) (0.337) 
Log of Canon Per Capita 0.0397 0.0405 0.0398 0.0403 
 (0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0746) (0.0746) 
Log of Total Ordinary 
Resources -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.338*** -0.338*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0713) (0.0713) (0.0713) 
Local Conflict Indicator 1 X 
Number of Peasant 
Communities 0.0251*    
 (0.0141)    
Local Conflict Indicator 1  X 
Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares  -2.177   
  (8.098)   
Local Conflict Indicator 2   -0.138 -0.0523 
   (0.127) (0.134) 
Local Conflict Indicator 2 X 
Number of Peasant 
Communities   0.0456*  
   (0.0276)  
Local Conflict Indicator 1 X 
Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares    -3.856 
    (15.30) 
Non-Parametric Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -5.586*** -5.607*** -5.582*** -5.606*** 
 (1.791) (1.791) (1.791) (1.791) 
     
Observations 6,420 6,420 6,420 6,420 
R-squared 0.766 0.765 0.766 0.765 
Number of Districts 1,601 1,601 1,601 1,601 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, all the estimations include year and district fixed effects. All estimations 
also include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean 
value of rural population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 





 4.3 The Effects of Mining NVR Campaigns and Social Capital on Local Government’s 
Public Goods Provision  
In this subsection, I empirically test proposition 3 of the CCESC model applied to mining 
NVR campaigns. Proposition 3 establishes a positive interactive relationship between the 
mining NVR indicator and social capital, together these variables increase the budget for 
public good provision using Ordinary resources. 
The positive interactive effect of proposition 3 can be tested by estimating the following 
equation: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂. 𝑅.tuv− 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂. 𝑅.tuw )Z^
= 𝛽h + 𝛽=𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ + 𝛽9𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ ∙ 𝑆𝐶Z + 𝛽:𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ + 𝛽x𝑂. 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶Z^
+ 𝛿𝑋Z^ + 𝛼Z + 𝜃Z^ + 𝛾^ + 𝑣Z^. . . (6) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂. 𝑅.tuv− 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑂. 𝑅.tuw )Z^ is the log of the difference between the final and initial 
budget used for investment expenditures financed with Ordinary Resources.  𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ is 
one of the two mining NVR camping indicators discussed in section 3.1.1.,  𝐶𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐶Z^ is 
the log of the canon per-capita in the current year, 𝑆𝐶Z is one of the two social capital 
indicators discussed in section 3.1.3, 𝑂. 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶Z^ is the log of the total ordinary 
resources per-capita in the current year,   𝑋Z^ is a set of controls, 𝛼Z and 𝛾^	are district and 
year fixed effects. If Proposition 3 is supported by the data when analyzing mining NVR 
campaigns, the estimated value of the parameter 𝛽9 should be positive and statistically 
significant.   
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Besides the mining NVR campaigns and social capital, I have also included other sources 
of financing that the central government might consider when deciding to reallocate its 
ordinary resources towards investment expenditures of the local governments. For this 
reason, I included the canon revenues and the total amount of ordinary resources assigned 
to the local government. Higher canon revenues (which have to be used for investment 
expenditures) can make the central government reluctant to transfer additional resources 
for investments financed with ordinary resources.  Already high levels of ordinary 
resources can make harder for the local government to transfer additional ordinary 
resources to local governments.  
 
The potential multicollinearity and simultaneity bias problems of the estimation in section 
4.2 are also present in the estimation of equation 6, and the conclusion is similar: if despite 
of the multicollinearity and simultaneity bias problems, a positive and significant effect 
is found, then this estimated effect can be interpreted as a lower bound for the true effect.  
 In Table 26, I present the results of the estimation of equation 6 for the two indicators of 
mining NVR campaigns and also for the two indicators of social capital used in Chapter 
3. The first two columns show the results using the first mining NVR campaign indicator 
presented in Chapter 3, 𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^, as independent variable. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
results using 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ as main independent variables. Interactive positive and significant 
effects are found only when the geographical spread in hectares of the peasant 
communities, 𝐻𝑎Z, is used as social capital indicator (Columns 2 and 4), the estimation 
using the number of legally recognized peasant communities,	𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛Z, did not result in 
statistically significant estimates. This pattern contrast with the obtained analyzing the 
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effects of local NVR campaigns, in which the interactions of NVR campaign indicators 
with the number of legally recognized peasant communities did have statistically 
significant estimates. These opposite patterns might suggest marginal differences between 
the two social capital indicators. The geographical spread of peasant communities is a 
better indicator of the agricultural activities carried by peasant communities than the 
number of peasant communities. Giving that mining activities are more likely to affect 
agricultural activities, it makes sense that the geographical spread in hectares of the 
peasant communities captures better the interaction effect of mining NVR campaigns and 
social capital. 
Similar to section 4.2., I have included district fixed effects to deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity constant in time as well as year fixed effects to account for shocks that 
affected similarly to all districts in the same year. Finally, I also included non-parametric 
trends such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above the mean value for 












 Dependent Variable: Log of the difference between PIM and PIA of Investment Expenditures financed with 
Ordinary Resources (2007-2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Ncomun Hectares Ncomun Hectares 
          
Mining Conflict Indicator 1 -0.0559* -0.0654**   
 (0.0299) (0.0302)   
Log of Canon Per Capita 0.149 0.150 0.149 0.150 
 (0.0963) (0.0963) (0.0964) (0.0963) 
Log of Ordinary Resources -0.212** -0.212** -0.212** -0.213** 
 (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0833) (0.0834) 
Mining Conflict Indicator 1 X 
Number of Peasant Communities 0.00415    
 (0.00330)    
Mining Conflict Indicator 1 X 
Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares  1.424**   
  (0.702)   
Mining Conflict Indicator 2   -0.0983* -0.109* 
   (0.0579) (0.0565) 
Mining Conflict Indicator 2 X 
Number of Peasant Communities   0.00869  
   (0.00709)  
Mining Conflict Indicator 2 X 
Recognized Peasant 
Communities’ Hectares    2.598* 
    (1.354) 
Constant -1.247 -1.245 -1.248 -1.247 
 (0.975) (0.975) (0.975) (0.975) 
     
Observations 8,085 8,085 8,085 8,085 
R-squared 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 
Number of Districts 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, all the estimations include year and district fixed effects. All estimations also 
include non-parametric trends, such as year fixed effects interacted with indicators of above- the mean value of rural 
population poverty, access to water, sanitation, and education levels. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 26. The Effects of Mining Conflicts con Public Goods Provision 
 
In the estimates of columns 2 and 4 (that have the significant positive interactive effects), 
mining NVR campaigns have positive effects for legally recognized hectares higher than 
0.046 million (the mean value among the districts that have a nonnegative number of 
hectares is 0.012). Hence, obtaining investment transfers from the central government will 
require to be in the top 20 percentile of registered hectares. In other words, the districts 
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with the biggest peasant communities are more likely to obtain concessions with the 
central government. 
 
Considering the estimation in column 2, the effect of one standard deviation increase in 
𝐶1𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ can have effects ranging from 1.5% to 9.47% of the variation of the investment 
expenditures financed with ordinary resources if we change from the percentile 90 to the 
percentile 95 of the legally recognized hectares variable. The estimation in column 4 have 
similar effects, one standard deviation increase in 𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁Z^ can have effects ranging from 
2.65% to 10.46% of the variation of the investment expenditures financed with ordinary 



















Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has shown theoretically and empirically that social capital can have 
contrasting roles in conflict (NVR campaigns). Previous theories commonly argued that 
social capital helps to facilitate cooperation. Thus, it was expected that the presence of 
social capital makes disruptive collective actions more likely. But social capital is also 
useful to transfer information about the capacity to engage in sustained collective 
actions by local organizations. This dissertation shows that this characteristic of social 
capital can mitigate the need to resort to disruptive actions under some circumstances. 
Hence, social capital can help to generate disruptive collective actions but can also prevent 
the use of such disruptive means. This is a feature of the relationship of social capital and 
conflict that has not been previously developed nor supported empirically and is the main 
contributions of this dissertation.  
Another theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it provides an explanation of 
the use of disruptive means to obtain concessions. Disruptive means are necessary 
because of the type of equilibrium present at the local level in new democracies or in 
democracies with weak party systems. In these democracies, agreements must be enforced 
mainly by the parties of the agreement. Consequently, agreements can be explained as 
trigger strategies equilibria. In a trigger strategies equilibrium, the receiver of claims and 
the claimants compare the earnings and the costs of defection and decide to stay in the 
equilibrium path. When a resource boom occurs, due to incomplete information, 
disruptive actions will be necessary to assess the potential costs of defection in the new 
 
 117 
required equilibrium. Thus, the CCESC model concludes that disruptive actions are 
necessary to move from one equilibrium to another under incomplete information.  
Using data from Perú, one of the main empirical conclusions of Chapter 3 is that peasant 
communities played a crucial role in the majority of NVR campaigns that occurred as a 
consequence of revenue windfalls.  Previous works on the Peruvian context did not pay 
attention to the role of peasant communities even though these are the main form of 
organization in the rural space. Also, previous works treated all conflicts as theoretically 
equivalent without paying attention to the different types of receiver of claims. This 
dissertation shows that there is a crucial difference. When the receiver of claims is 
internal, in local conflicts, strong peasant communities reduced the intensity of these 
conflicts and made concessions more likely; depending on the levels of social capital, the 
effects range from 2% to around 9% of the mean value of the corresponding dependent 
variables (mining or local). On the other hand, when the receiver of claims is external, as 
in mining conflicts, strong peasant communities increased the intensity of these conflicts 
but still made concessions more likely; these effects range from 2% to around 10% of the 
of the mean value of the corresponding dependent variables.   
Although the CCESC model argues that all social capital is relevant to explaining the 
contrasting effects of social capital on conflict, the results in Chapter 3 and the robustness 
checks in section 3.3 point towards peasant communities’ social capital as the main source 
that explains the contrasting effects. Other social organizations did not show robust 
contrasting effects. As discussed in section 3.1.3, this might occur because these other 





From the estimations in section 3.4, I conclude that peasant communities’ capacity to 
organize and resist to external actors is ultimately a product of colonial extractive 
institutions that sought to extract surplus from the indigenous populations through many 
different institutions (mining mita, reparto, indigenous tribute, reductions, etc.). Since 
social capital requires use to be preserved, rebellions in the 18th century are one of the 
main sources and channels of persistence of the high capacity to cooperate and resist to 
external actors. Another channel of persistence is the process of getting peasant 
communities’ land legally recognized. To obtain legal recognition in the first half of the 
20th century, peasant communities required to use their high capacity to organize which 
in turn helped to the preservation of that capacity. From the results in section 3.4. this 
dissertation concludes that rebellions and extractive colonial institutions are predictors of 
current mining NVR campaigns, but they are not predictors of local NVR campaigns. 
These results suggest that peasant communities have a persistent capacity to organize and 
resist particularly against external actors, but this capacity is used differently when 
contentious situations occur among internal actors. 
 
The estimations in Chapter 4, show that NVR campaigns can change the public policy at 
the local level. These effects are stronger with stronger peasant communities regardless 
the type of receiver of claims (regardless the type of conflict, local or mining). The part 
of the public policies affected by NVR campaigns and peasant communities are the 
expenditures on investments which are mostly used for the provision of public goods such 
as roads, schools, and other durable goods.  Local NVR campaigns affected the 
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investments financed with local government’s own resources. However, mining NVR 
campaigns affected the investments financed with transfers from the central government’s 
resources and not with mining firms’ resources. Future work should systematize 
information about the resources transferred by mining firm’s to better assess the 




































Matrix of Correlations Peasant Communities’ Indicators and Other Social Indicators 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12) 
 (1) Number of 
Peasant Communities 
1.000 




 (3) Population with 
No Spanish as first 
Language(%) 
-0.484 -0.224 1.000 
 (4) Extremely Poor 
Population (%) 
0.327 0.216 -0.461 1.000 
 (5) Rural Poverty 
2007 (%) 
0.300 0.185 -0.308 0.481 1.000 
 (6) Urban 
Population (%) 
-0.299 -0.181 0.329 -0.467 -
0.910 
1.000 
 (7) Poverty. 2007(%) -0.044 -0.053 0.107 -0.173 -0.255 0.275 1.000 
 (8)Has Public 
Sewage System (%) 
-0.200 -0.159 0.279 -0.441 -
0.635 
0.645 0.400 1.000 
 (9) Has Access to 
clean Water (%) 
-0.145 -0.172 0.130 -0.331 -
0.450 
0.432 0.185 0.577 1.000 
 (10) Has Access to 
Electricity (%)  
-0.138 -0.210 0.256 -0.512 -
0.669 
0.644 0.218 0.587 0.470 1.000 
 (11) No education 
(%) 
0.298 0.130 -0.555 0.592 0.575 -0.562 -0.194 -0.470 -0.273 -0.518 1.000 
 (12) Finished the 
High School (%) 
-0.129 -0.069 0.196 -0.531 -
0.520 












Dependent Variable.: Local Conflict Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝐿𝑂𝐶) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
              
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita 5.85e-05 0.0141 0.0102 0.00943 -0.00237 0.00249 
 (0.0113) (0.00923) (0.00993) (0.00899) (0.00835) (0.0140) 
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Urban 
Population (%) -0.00278      
 (0.0176)      




Speakers (%)  -0.0399***     
  (0.0134)     
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Rural 
Poverty (%)   -0.0219    
   (0.0196)    




(%)    -0.0451*   
    (0.0242)   
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per 
Capita X Access 
to Public Sewage 
System (%)     -0.00335  
     (0.0236)  





Level (%)      -0.0304 
      (0.0754) 
Non-Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 0.429*** 0.298*** -0.0104 0.0579 0.0877 0.0857 
 (0.130) (0.114) (0.0913) (0.0548) (0.0609) (0.0630) 
       
Observations 9,546 9,696 9,702 9,702 9,696 9,696 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
Districts 1,591 1,616 1,617 1,617 1,616 1,616 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Even 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as department-by-year fixed effects, and year fixed effects interacted with 





Dependent Variable.: Mining Conflict Indicator 2 (𝐶2𝑀𝐼𝑁) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
              
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 0.0365 -0.0333 -0.0399 -0.0481 -0.00947 -0.0395 
 (0.0325) (0.0231) (0.0263) (0.0323) (0.0230) (0.0337) 
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Urban 
Population (%) -0.0790      
 (0.0509)      
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Non-Spanish 
Native Speakers 
(%)  0.0968**     
  (0.0420)     
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Rural Poverty 
(%)   0.0858    
   (0.0525)    
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Extreme 
Poverty (%)    0.221**   
    (0.109)   
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Access to 
Public Sewage 
System (%)     0.103  
     (0.0643)  
Lagged Log of 
Canon Per Capita 
X Population with 
no Education 
Level (%)      0.266 
      (0.193) 
Non-
Parametric 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
Constant 0.143 0.267* 0.140 -0.275 -0.273 -0.266 
 (0.137) (0.152) (0.113) (0.180) (0.204) (0.203) 
       
Observations 9,546 9,696 9,702 9,702 9,696 9,696 
R-squared 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.029 
Number of 
Districts 1,591 1,616 1,617 1,617 1,616 1,616 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Robust standard errors. All regressions include district and year fixed effects. Even 
Columns include non-parametric trends, such as department-by-year fixed effects, and year fixed effects interacted with indicators of 







In this Appendix, I discuss briefly the history of peasant communities in colonial times 
and during the Republican period. 
Peasant or Indigenous Communities in Colonial Times 
In the first decades of the colony, the Spanish crown created a set of institutions intended 
to extract surplus from the local population and to consolidate a dominant group in the 
colonies. The first institution created was The Encomienda, which assigned a group of 
indigenous people to a Spanish conqueror (The Encomendero) which had certain 
obligations towards the indigenous populations such as teaching them catholic beliefs, 
teaching them how to work, and how to prosper. The Crown established that the 
indigenous people were vassals of the crown (cannot be slaves) that have to pay a tribute 
or tax (“tributo” in Spanish) to the King. This tribute was payed to the owner of the 
encomienda or “Encomendero”. In principle, the indigenous population had their own 
ways of subsistence outside the markets and they not required much access to Spanish 
coin. However, as new vassals of the Spanish Crown, now they have to pay the tribute to 
the “Encomendero” which normally were paid either in workforce or with goods due to 
the scarce access to Spanish coin that the indigenous population had. In practice, the 
encomienda helped to solve the most important problem in the colonies: the lack of a 
sizeable workforce. The Encomienda was an institution designed to promote early 
conquest expeditions and settlements under the Spanish hierarchy and institutions. An 
Encomienda was given perpetually but with no land possession, later the encomienda was 
set to last only two generations. This happened by the interest of the crown in obtaining 
as much revenue as possible and also because the crown did not want feudal lords in its 
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colonies. The mining activities will be the core of the colonial economy32. The most 
important institutions that allowed the Crown to exploit the mineral resource of its 
colonies were set by Viceroy Toledo (1569-1581), for this reason Toledo is one of the 
most important viceroys in the history of The Peruvian Viceroyalty. Given the need to 
provide an important workforce to the Huancavelica and Potosí mines, Toledo established 
the Mining Mita. The Minig Mita was a forced mining labor system in the south of the 
Peruvian Viceroyalty that started in 1570 and lasted until 1812.  In addition to the Mining 
Mita, Toledo also created The Reductions, which were settlements modeled as towns and 
villages in Spain in which the indigenous population was relocated forcibly. This was 
done in order to have better information about the size of the indigenous population, and 
to better control them.  The relocation of the population generated by the reductions 
structured what is known today as peasant communities. In this sense, today’s Peruvian 
peasant communities are more a product of the conquest and colonial times than a product 
of pre-hispanic forms of organizations (Fuenzalida, 1969). Still some elements of pre-
hispanic hierarchies were present within the reductions, the most important was the 
existence of a “Curaca”33 which had a higher rank than regular indigenous people known 
as “Hatunruna”. The authority of the Curacas did not come entirely from the Crown but 
also from the Pre-Hispanic social configurations that entailed responsibilities of 
reciprocity and redistribution, thus the Curacas were mediators between the colonial 
authorities and the vast majority of the indigenous population. Once the indigenous 
 
32 The revenue obtained from the tribute paid by the indigenous population was also important: In the 
decade of 1560- 69, revenue from indigenous tribute was of similar order of magnitude as the revenue 
obtained from the mining activity in the Potosí mine (Neojovich, 2009:64). 
33 This subgroup of the indigenous population was composed for those that were able to prove their 
kindship links with the Inca nobility. They did not pay the tribute or tax to the crown, they have the right 
to private property, they were allowed to be educated in special schools, etc. 
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population was organized in reductions, reductions were required to contribute one-
seventh of his male population for the Mita. Not all reductions were required to provide 
labor force for the Mining Mita but only some, which reductions will contribute will 
depend on their proximity to the mines (Quito, Huancavelica or Potosí) and on the total 
number of labor force required by the mine. The Mita required 14,181 conscripts from 
southern Peru and Bolivia to Potosí and 3,280 conscripts from central and southern Peru 
to Huancavelica (Bakewell, 1984). These numbers represented around the 3% of the 
whole male population living in the current Peruvian boundaries at a given point in time. 
The percentage of males that participated in the mita at some point in time was 
considerably higher, as men in subjected territories were supposed to serve once every 
seven years (Dell, 2010:1867). The contribution of each district to the mita was strictly 
enforced, the Curacas had the responsibility of ensuring that conscripts reported to mine 
duties, if they were unable to provide their quote, they were required to pay in silver the 
sum needed to hire wage laborers replacements. Given these extreme conditions, some 
authors considered the service in the mita as having characteristics of genocide or 
ethnocide (Cotler, 1978). During the XVI and XVII centuries, indigenous population 
decreased as consequence of these extreme life conditions and also as consequence of 
diseases. Moreover, the decrease of the indigenous population made the weight on the 
survivors higher.  In these circumstances, the Crown divided its colonial territories in 
provinces called “Corregimientos”, each province had a mayor or “Corregidor”. The 
Corregidor collected taxes and had judicial authority at the local level. This dual political 
power was often used to obtain side gains from office. These gains could be obtained from 
overtaxing, from forcing sales of goods to the local population (These forced sales were 
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called “Reparto”), or from mobilizing labor for their own advantage. Furthermore, the 
governor position was sold by the crown to the highest bidder. Given that the year salary 
of a governor was very low, this generated that those in charge of a governorship focused 
mainly in extracting surplus from the indigenous population to make a profit from their 
investment, an extractive governor could raise around 30 to 150 times his salary (Andrien, 
1982). Because of this pattern of behavior, the “Corregidor” became a symbol of abuse 
and exploitation in the Colonies.  
To summarize, the indigenous population have a very heavy burden over their shoulders. 
They have to pay tribute to the Corregidor, the tithe to the church, they have to buy the 
products from the “reparto” at very high prices, and they also have to work in the mining 
mita. As a consequence of this political and economic situation indigenous populations 
often resisted to abuses from the Corregidor, the Encomendero, or the church. For 
instance, in 1719 in the city of Cayna located in what is known today as the Huánuco 
province, the Curaca and the indigenous population rebelled against the representative of 
the Church. The next year, in 1920, another revolt occurred in Muyunmarca, Huanta. This 
revolt occurred against the mita tributes. These revolts and 138 more that occurred in the 
XVIII century have been collected and studied by Scarlet O’phelan in his famous book 
“A Century of Colonial Revolts” (1985). As I will show later, I used this dataset to argue 
that colonial rebellions and revolts are conflictive situations that will have persistent 
effects on social capital and in the formation of legally recognized peasant communities.  
Among the 140 revolts and rebellions listed in O’phelan’s book, 119 occurred within the 
current Peruvian boundaries.  
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O’Phelan identified three main waves in the XVIII century in which revolts and rebellions 
accumulated importantly. The first wave occurred during Viceroy Castelfuerte’s tenure 
(1724-1736) due to his aggressive fiscal policies (that included a Census to identify 
“indios forasteros34”) after that a cholera epidemic affected the southern provinces. The 
second wave occurred after the legalization of the compulsory “reparto” of goods to the 
indigenous population (1751-1756). The third and last wave occurred as consequence of 
the Borbon Reforms implemented in 1777 by the “Visitor” José de Areche, this wave 
ended with the Great Rebellion of Tupac Amaru which spread through most parts of the 
commercial lines in the southern provinces. Thus, according to O’Phelan, the Great 
rebellion occurred as a culmination of a process initiated by minor revolts and also as a 
consequence of increasing economic and fiscal pressures that affected not only to the 
indigenous population but to other actors of the Peruvian Viceroyalty.  
 
Peasant or Indigenous Communities after the Independence 
The Peruvian proclamation of independence occurred in Lima in 1821, around thirty years 
after the Great Rebellion of Tupac Amaru. In its proclamation of independence, José de 
San Martin abolished the indigenous tribute in 1821 with the hope of gaining the rural 
population to the independence cause but this tribute was reestablished five years later in 
1826, two years after the independence was consolidated. This tribute existed until 1854, 
when the revenues from the extraction of the guano (which was used as a fertilizer) 
allowed to dispense the indigenous tribute. The indigenous contribution was reestablished 
in 1877 by the president Pardo only to be abolished later to gain support from the 
 
34 “Indios forasteros” were that part of the population that with the objective of avoiding the payment of 
tributes, mita, etc. managed to not be counted officially in the Spanish population records. 
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indigenous population at the beginning of the war with Chile (1879-1883) by the 
strongman Nicolas de Pierola. However, during the rest of the war and after the war was 
ended, the indigenous contribution was reestablished until it was finally abolished again 
by Pierola in 1895. To address fiscal constraints, Pierola created a tax over the production 
and distribution of the salt in 1896, this commodity was very important for the indigenous 
population economy in that period. For this reason, many revolts against the salt tax 
collectors were observed during that year. During this period, the revolts and protests 
were mainly against fiscal pressures35 (indigenous tribute, salt tax, etc.).Thus, in the first 
century of the new Peruvian Republic, the conditions of life of the indigenous population 
were far from being similar to rest of the free citizens, the new created state will continue 
to exert a heavy tax burden over the indigenous population to solve fiscal constraints.  
The late 19th century and early 20th century was a period of expansion of the rural states   
(Haciendas). These estates existed during colonial times and also during the republic 
times.  The haciendas had their own indigenous workforce, these were called “yanaconas” 
or “colonos”. This part of the indigenous population did not have their own land but 
worked for no salary in the lands of the “Hacendados” or “Gamonales” (The owners of 
the hacienda). It is well-known that inside the haciendas the living conditions of the 
indigenous population was of semi-slavery. The Hacendados not only abused of the 
“yanaconas” but also harm the indigenous population that lived outside the hacienda, the 
“indigenous or peasant” communities by expanding illegally their lands, with the leniency 
of the judicial authorities and the central government.  Two rebellions against the 
haciendas are particularly relevant in this period, the Atusparia upraising in the Ancash 
 
35 Kapsoli (1977) has counted 44 peasant movements in this period of time. 
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region (March-September, 1885) and the Rumi Maqui revolt in the Puno region (1915). 
At the beginning  of the 20th century, namely,  in the period between 1900 and1920 
important changes occurred in the south Andean region product of an growing 
international demand for wool (from vicuña and sheep). To take advantage of this 
favorable international context, the haciendas develop an aggressive process of land 
concentration to which the peasant communities and small owners successfully resisted. 
Is in these years that peasant communities thrive and acquire sufficient economic 
dynamism to resist the power of the Haciendas. During the first years of Augusto B. 
Leguía’s tenure (1919-1930), a new constitution was enacted in 1920, this was the first 
constitution to recognize the legal existence of the indigenous communities. Leguía also 
created an office for the defense of the indigenous population (Patronato de la Raza 
Indigena) in 1922. This office received at least 837 complaints against the Hacendados 
for illegal usurpation of agricultural and pasture lands (Kapsoli, 1977:53). The support of 
the Leguia’s government to the indigenous population was only apparent, the indigenous 
population continued resisting and rebelling during Leguia’s government without much 
support from the central government. In 1930 the secretary for indigenous education was 
created and in 1937 the first indigenous community law was enacted. In this period other 
processes started like the migration to the city in the end of 1940s and early 1950s.  The 
raise of the proletarian movements, the communist party, etc. The hacienda system still 
was pervasive in the rural areas during this period, although since 1920s the “yanaconas” 
(indigenous population living within the haciendas) also started to rebel and request to be 
recognized as peasant communities. The two main authors that have studied peasant 
movements in this period differ in what are the relevant periods of study. According to 
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Alberto Flores Galindo peasant movements have a relevant period in the years between 
1945 and 1964, after the second world war until some years before the agrarian reform. 
According to Wilfredo Kapsoli, the same period should be divided in two periods of study 
1945-1948 and 1956-1965. Kapsoli does not consider the eight years of the authoritarian 
Manuel Odria. Since this government was a dictatorship, peasant rebellions, revolts, etc. 
were unlikely in this period.  
 
In fact, the peasant communities that managed to be legally recognized in this period show 
an important decrease compared with the previous years since 1920. Peasant communities 
started to obtain legal recognition after the enactment of the 1920 constitution. 
Furthermore, the first peasant community to be recognized did it in 1921, this was the 
“Machaccoyo” peasant community. This community is located in the Canas province in 
the Cuzco region which is the birthplace of Tupac Amaru II. Thus, the first peasant 
community to obtain legal recognition is located at the center of the provinces that were 
part of the Great Rebellion. Moreover, during the 1930’s, 16 more peasant communities 
from the Canas province managed to obtain legal recognition.   
The case of the Canas province raises the question about whether organizing violent 
insurrections generate persistent effects in the peasant communities’ capacity to cooperate 
even after 130 years. I argue that the answer to this question is affirmative: Participation 
in violent insurrections in the past can have persistent effects in the capacity to cooperate 
in the future, namely, violent insurrections can have persistent effects on social capital. 
This assertion is in line with a recent literature about the positive effects of civil wars 
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violence on social capital (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman and Annan, 2010; De 
Luca and Verpoorten, 2015; Bauer et al., 2016). 
The persistent effects of revolts and rebellions on social capital can operate in the 
following way: the indigenous population experienced violence from many sources (the 
Corregidor, the encomendero, the administrators of the mines, etc.). This violence 
promoted cooperation either as a social insurance or to promote rebellions that allow them 
to respond to the violence and resist to abuses. This cooperation was constantly used in 
intracommunity activities, in actions against a state that was permanently imposing 
burden over the community, or because they have to resists to the expansion of the 
Haciendas. This constant use of the cooperation generated persistent high levels of social 
capital36 which facilitated cooperation to obtain legal recognition after the 1920 
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